ÔThis enlightening volume provides an invaluable guide for those perplexed by the seemingly intractable problems of financial crises, sovereign distress, and government guarantees. Contributors include an all-star cast of leading figures in the field. Highly recommended.Õ Ð Geoffrey Miller, New York University, US ÔThe history of the 2007Ð09 and possibly beyond near-global financial crisis needs to be examined carefully in order to identify and understand the causes, the transmission across countries, the harm to macroeconomies, the public policies adopted, the effectiveness of such policies, and the lessons to be learned to prevent or at least mitigate future such crises. This volume contributes to this task. It brings together under one cover the analyses of the various aspects of the crisis by experts in each area. It should be priority reading for serious students of the crisis.Õ Ð George G. Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago, US ÔThe combination of the skills of the lawyer and of the economist has proved increasingly fruitful, developing both understanding and policy in many areas of life, such as accident prevention, crime prevention, and healthcare. This book follows the precedent of these areas and assembles a group of lawyers and economists who by their contributions, consider how best to deal with financial crises, and how to make their future occurrence less likely. It is both intellectually stimulating and practically important. The authors and editors are to be congratulated.Õ Ð Geoffrey Wood, Cass Business School and University of Buckingham, UK Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees analyses the international communityÕs commitment to forging enhanced, well thought-out, mechanisms for containing systemic risks in the context of a highly interconnected global financial framework which incorporates ongoing financial innovation. While use of government guarantees is a central theme, the book also analyses the roles played by prudential regulators, central banks, deposit insurers and treasuries in dealing with the crisis. The book examines how governments, central banks, regulators and deposit insurance agencies have worked together to contain the global financial crisis. Additionally, it focuses on efforts to overcome ongoing obstacles, as well as the most important proposals to improve safety nets, both at the national level and internationally. This concise and detailed book will strongly appeal to students in law, economics and finance, law practitioners, policymakers in central banks and ministries of finance, as well as deposit protection agencies and regulatory agencies.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.

This book analyzes government policies to contain and resolve systemic financial crises.

The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.

Fiscal reporting is intended to warn of fiscal crises while there is still time to prevent them. The recent crisis thus seems to reveal a failure of fiscal reporting: before the crisis, even reports on fiscal risk typically did not mention banks as a possible source of fiscal problems. One reason for silence was that the risk arose partly from implicit guarantees, and governments may have feared that disclosure would increase moral hazard. The crisis cast doubt, however, on the effectiveness of silence in mitigating risks. This paper discusses how fiscal risks from the financial sector could be discussed in reports on fiscal risk, with a view to encouraging their mitigation.