No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.

This volume presents a unified mathematical framework for the transmission channels for damaging shocks that can lead to instability in financial systems. As the title suggests, financial contagion is analogous to the spread of disease, and damaging financial crises may be better understood by bringing to bear ideas from studying other complex systems in our world. After considering how people have viewed financial crises and systemic risk in the past, it delves into the mechanics of the interactions between banking counterparties. It finds a common mathematical structure for types of crises that proceed through cascade mappings that approach a cascade equilibrium. Later chapters follow this theme, starting from the underlying random skeleton graph, developing into the theory of bootstrap percolation, ultimately leading to techniques that can determine the large scale nature of contagious financial cascades.

An argument that contagion is the most significant risk facing the financial system and that Dodd¬Frank has reduced the government's ability to respond effectively. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd–Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis—that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion.

A sweeping critical account of the financial crises that rocked East Asia and other parts of the world beginning with the collapse of the Thai baht in 1997. Padma Desai retraces the story of Asia's "Crisis Five"--Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.

"Financial Contagion: The Viral Threat to the Wealth of Nations covers a lot of territory. It is, of course, terribly important to analyze case histories to discover potential triggers, mechanisms of transmission, and viable ways to contain the damage of financial contagion. The problem is, as these articles amply demonstrate, that there’s always a new virus or a mutation of a former one lurking in some corner of the financial world. We don’t know what it is or where it is. And, even if we had some inkling, there’s almost never enough time to develop a financial flu shot." --SeekingAlpha.com The latest insights on financial contagion and how both nations and investors can effectively deal with it. The domino-style structure in which the financial system exists is a perilous one. Although historically, the financial system has been able to deal with major shocks, the fact remains that our financial system is not as secure as it should be. Recent years have brought about too many examples of contagion and systemic risk. That is why Financial Contagion is such an important read. In it, the serious concerns that revolve around our fragile economic system are investigated, researched, and explained. Throughout the book, Kolb offers valuable insights on this dilemma as he compiles the history of financial contagion, highlights the latest research on systemic failure and interrelated markets, and analyzes the risks and consequences we face moving forward. Examines the importance of careful regulation and what must be done to stabilize the global financial system Includes contributed chapters from both academics and experienced professionals, offering a variety of perspectives and a rich interplay of ideas Details how close we are to witnessing a financial contagion that could devastate the world economy We have been harshly reminded of how fragile our economic ecosystem is. With Financial Contagion, you'll hold a better understanding of what needs to be done to strengthen our system and safeguard our financial future.

This book is an authoritative account of the economic and political roots of the 2008 financial crisis. It examines why it was triggered in the United States, why it morphed into the Great Recession, and why the contagion spread with such ferocity around the globe. It also examines how and why economies - including the Eurozone, Russia, China, India, East Asia, and the Middle East - have been impacted and explores their response to the unprecedented challenges of the crisis and the effectiveness of their policy measures. Global Financial Contagion specifically looks at how the Obama administration's policy missteps have contributed to America's huge debt and slow recovery, why the Eurozone's response to its existential crisis has become a never-ending saga, and why the G-20's efforts to create a new international financial architecture may fall short. This book will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.

This book aims to integrate the notions of contagion in epidemiology and contagion in financial market crises to discover why emerging markets are so susceptible to financial crises. The author first provides a brief introduction of the contagious spill-over of recent financial market crises and models the pattern of these crises. He finds that the contagion between crises in emerging markets, such as that of the crises in Russia and Brazil in 1998-1999, is explicable, despite the fact that at first sight they appear to have little in common. Finally, Friedrich Sell integrates these findings to outline a proposal for a 'new international financial architecture'.