Field Marshal Lord Cavan (1865-1946) was one of the most distinguished commanders of the modern British army, but he divided opinion among his contemporaries. Some senior soldiers were disdainful. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson described him as ‘ignorant, pompous and vain’ and Brigadier General Sir James Edward Edmonds commented that Cavan ‘was bone from the neck upwards’. Yet many of Cavan’s subordinates praised him, saying ‘I had never seen Lord Cavan before and I was filled with admiration by the calm and quiet self-confidence of his manner’ and ‘Our new General, Lord Cavan, is simply A1 and the whole show runs like a well-oiled machine.’ So what were the real qualities and achievements of this remarkable but hitherto neglected officer who in a long career served in the Boer War and the First World War and then presided over the post-war reduction of the British army? Michael Senior, in the first full biography of Cavan, assesses him as a leader, a corps commander and an administrator, and places him among the front rank of the soldiers of his generation. He also explores Cavan’s personal life, his personality and how his aristocratic background, his wealth and his love of fox hunting affected his conduct in both war and peace.

Field Marshal Lord Cavan (1865-1946) was one of the most distinguished commanders of the modern British army, but he divided opinion among his contemporaries. Some senior soldiers were disdainful. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson described him as ‘ignorant, pompous and vain’ and Brigadier General Sir James Edward Edmonds commented that Cavan ‘was bone from the neck upwards’. Yet many of Cavan’s subordinates praised him, saying ‘I had never seen Lord Cavan before and I was filled with admiration by the calm and quiet self-confidence of his manner’ and ‘Our new General, Lord Cavan, is simply A1 and the whole show runs like a well-oiled machine.’ So what were the real qualities and achievements of this remarkable but hitherto neglected officer who in a long career served in the Boer War and the First World War and then presided over the post-war reduction of the British army? Michael Senior, in the first full biography of Cavan, assesses him as a leader, a corps commander and an administrator, and places him among the front rank of the soldiers of his generation. He also explores Cavan’s personal life, his personality and how his aristocratic background, his wealth and his love of fox hunting affected his conduct in both war and peace.

Rudolph Lambart, 10th Earl of Cavan, was a Grenadier Guardsman who served in the Boer War, later writing '..we heard as many bullets in the whole war as we heard in one day of the 1915-16 battles'. He retired in 1912 to be Master of the Hertfordshire Hunt, where he might have stayed had it not been for the outbreak of war in 1914. He commanded a brigade, then the Guards Division, where he took the young Prince of Wales under his wing, and later an army in Italy. In 1922 he became Chief of the Imperial General Staff, an appointment for which he did not feel qualified. He presided at a difficult time, in an era of public indifference and defence cuts. In 1939 he was back in uniform as a member of the Home Guard.Cavan was a leader who believed in order, discipline, and the importance of communicating clearly; the perfect Guardsman. He was well-read, learnt languages wherever he went, was charming and showed style, as demonstrated by the occasion when his 'cigar saved the situation' in November 1914. Had it not been for The Great War, he would have retired to the hunting field, yet he served throughout the war, becoming a Field Marshal. Then, at the beginning of another war, at the age of 75, he was taking up his spade to dig trenches to defend the approaches to Ayot St Lawrence from the invader.

Following the career of one relatively unknown First World War general, Lord Horne, this book adds to the growing literature that challenges long-held assumptions that the First World War was a senseless bloodbath conducted by unimaginative and incompetent generals. Instead it demonstrates that men like Horne developed new tactics and techniques to deal with the novel problems of trench warfare and in so doing seeks to re-establish the image of the British generals and explain the reasons for the failures of 1915-16 and the successes of 1917-18 and how this remarkable change in performance was achieved by a much maligned group of senior officers. Horne's important career and remarkable character sheds light not only on the major battles in which he was involved; the progress of the war; his relationships with his staff and other senior officers; the novel problems of trench warfare; the assimilation of new weapons, tactics and training methods; and the difficulties posed by the German defences, but also on the attitudes and professionalism of a senior British commander serving on the Western Front. Horne's career thus provides a vehicle for studying the performance of the British Army in the first quarter of the Twentieth Century. It also gives an important insight into the attitudes, ethos and professionalism of the officer corps which led that army to victory on the Western Front, exposing not only its flaws but also its many strengths. This study consequently provides a judgment not only on Horne as a personality, innovator and general of great importance but also on his contemporaries who served with the British Armies in South Africa and France during an era which saw a revolution in military affairs giving birth to a Modern Style of Warfare which still prevails to this day.

Biografi af P. Warner 1991 om Douglas Haig (1861-1926) engelsk feltmarskal, udnævnt til 1. Jarl af Haig 1919. Han deltog i krigene i Sudan 1883-98, Boerkrigen 1899-1902 og 1. Verdenskrig.

Having signed on the dotted line to be an Irish guardsman not fully understanding all that Queen and country, and other territories stuff, that after six weeks on my own help only by others, I slept beside in the gutter since leaving Ireland to see the world. Finding no work, food and shelter I was on my knees and making this last day as a homeless orphan in Liverpool to ask at the port about working my passage home to Dublin when I saw a window display asking for men to join the Irish guards that foxed my mind as to who or what Irish guards are. It was recruiter Sgt George Smylie Liverpool office kind offer of a cup of tea and biscuit and warm manner that close the deal making my dream to see the world happen.

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.