This collection focuses on the ways in which federalism has affected and been affected by economic reform, especially global integration. The editors and contributors focus in particular on the political economy of institutional and economic change - how the division of authority between national and subnational governments shapes debates over policy changes, as well as how the changing economic environment creates incentives to modify the basic agreements between levels of governments. Each chapter contains a historical overview, and an in-depth account of division of authority, lines of accountability, and legislative, bureaucratic, and other arenas in which the levels of government interact for a particular country. The analyses are based on reform (or non-reform) episodes for each country - most from recent history, but some spanning the century. As a collection, the country studies span a range of developing and industrial countries with varying political systems.

This book, first published in 2005, develops a comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians. In testing the argument with a combination of cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this book contributes to the broad literatures on development and the comparative political economy of federalism and decentralization.

This is a comprehensive work on India's fiscal federalism. The book surveys and analyses the evolution of fiscal federalism from the angle of political economy and brings to bear analytical skills of a very high order to assess and relate the political and administrative dimensions of India's federal system to fiscal federal issues. The authors present a synthesized framework, combining both economic and political elements in a political economy prism such as the Cente–State relations with not only the political perspectives but also the economic ones with the belief that only such a framework can provide a useful guide to implementable reform of policies.

This book describes and examines reforms of fiscal federalism and local government in 10 OECD countries implemented over the past decade.

Tracing the historical roots of India`s federalism, this book analyzes the changes brought about by the shift from one-party dominance to coalition politics and multi-party governance. Coupled with these changes, the author maintains that the process of economic liberalization has permanently altered the federal calculus in India. The book argues that these developments have transformed federal relations in India from intergovernmental competition between the central government and the states to interjurisdictional cooperation between the states. As a result, the states no longer need to rely exclusively on the central government for their economic and industrial development.