This report, commissioned by the Executive Board, was prepared by a committee of academic economists. The report assesses the appropriateness of current research activities, the quality and added value of the IMF's economic research and its utility in the IMF among its member countries and within the wider economics community. This publication also includes responses to the report by the IMF's staff, Managing Director, and Executive Board.

This evaluation report assesses research produced at the IMF between 1999 and 2008, focusing on the relevance and utilization of research to member country authorities, IMF staff, and other stakeholders. The report also examines the technical quality and management of research and offers recommendations for enhancing the relevance of research, improving the technical quality of analytical work, promoting openness to alternative perspectives, and improving the management of research.

The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has been developed by the IMF’s Research Department as a successor to the CGER methodology for assessing current accounts and exchange rates in a multilaterally consistent manner. Compared to other approaches, EBA emphasizes distinguishing between the positive empirical analysis and the normative assessment of current accounts and exchange rates, and highlights the roles of policies and policy distortions. This paper provides a comprehensive description and discussion of the 2013 version (“2.0”) of the EBA methodology, including areas for its further development.

We have been asked by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund to undertake an external review of the activities of its Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). This is the second such evaluation in the IEO’s twelve year history. The first review, led by Karin Lissakers (the “Lissakers Report”), was presented to the Board in 2006. That report considered the extent to which the Office had succeeded during its first five years of operation in fulfilling its mandates and made recommendations to enhance its role within the IMF’s institutional architecture. Our report thus focuses on IEO activities since 2006. As set out in the terms of reference of our Panel (see Appendix I), the central objective of this report is to evaluate how well the IEO has met its institutional mandates. The terms of reference, while not constraining the range of issues we could consider, also asks that we “assess the IEO’s effectiveness along several dimensions, including: (i) the appropriateness of evaluation topics; (ii) the independence of the IEO; (iii) the cost-effectiveness of the IEO and its operations; and (iv) the appropriateness and adequacy of the evaluation process including, but not limited to, how IEO recommendations are endorsed by the Board and implemented.”

The IMF's surveillance over its member'seconomic policies is one of the institution's central activities. In keeping with the increasing transparency of the IMF; the Executive Board askes a group of independent external experts to evaluate IMF surveillance, to assess the effectiveness of such surveillance, and to make recommendations for improvements. The group's report looks at the methods, substance, and impact of surveillance, both on individual countries and on the global economy. This publication also includes the reactions of the Executive Board, management, and the staff to the external evaluation.

Over the past six months, a key theme has been ensuring strong follow-up to IEO evaluations, a priority stressed by the recently competed External Evaluation of the IEO. Of particular note, the Managing Director has issued a statement highlighting actions planned to strengthen the IMF’s engagement with fragile states following our recent evaluation, and this statement is being presented to the IMFC for endorsement. In addition, the IEO has completed two updates of past evaluations, advanced work on two ongoing evaluations (on IMF financial surveillance and on IMF advice related to unconventional monetary policies), and is now considering its future work program in light of the External Evaluation.

The benefits of independent evaluation in international financial institutions have long been recognized. However, independent evaluation in these organizations is of increased relevance during uncertain times that call for more credible and legitimate institutions. While evaluation has long played a function in the IMF, and its role has expanded substantially with the creation of the IEO, independent evaluation has yet to take on a role within the IMF that fully reflects its potential contribution. A strong global economy requires a strong IMF, and a strong IMF requires a strong independent evaluation culture and practice. The establishment of the IEO was only the start of a process that still needs to be fostered and cultivated. Successful independent evaluation is important for the IMF to be perceived as legitimate and credible—and to achieve it, the independent evaluation function needs to be further integrated in the learning process and culture of the Fund. Independent evaluation has played a significant role in contributing to the improvement of the IMF, but the pending challenge is for the IMF and the IEO to create a shared culture that fully embraces the purpose and mission of the IEO, and the learning opportunities offered by independent evaluation. The IMF’s organizational culture has a profound role to play in prompting actions to make learning from independent evaluation a more vibrant element of the Fund’s activities. This book calls on IMF management to take a more active role in instilling the positive value of independent evaluation across the organization and thus enabling independent evaluation to bring the IMF closer to what the literature defines as the ideal of a “learning organization.”