Most baseball traditions are wonderful. But not all of them. The games most basic elements have often been misrepresented, misunderstood, and misremembered through the years. All along, fiction has coexisted with fact, hyperbole has mixed with history, and exaggeration has been mistaken for explanation. Meanwhile, baseballs yen for tradition has left many fans and even baseball commentators unduly attached to stale ways of thinking. Peter Handrinos breaks from the past and provides an entertaining antidote to its outmoded ideas and excessive nostalgia.

Bestselling sportswriter John Feinstein exposes the big money and back-room deals that pervade college-basketball recruiting in this fast-break young adult novel. Terrell Jamerson is the #1 high school basketball player in the country. His team is poised to win State, top colleges are lining up to give him scholarships, and everyone says he could play in the NBA tomorrow. But it only takes one false step to lose everything. Danny Wilcox is Terrell’s best friend and teammate, and a top prospect himself, but these days it seems like everyone wants to get close to Terrell: the sneaker guys, the money managers, the college boosters. They show up offering fast cars, hot girls, and cold, hard cash. They say they just want to help, but their kind of help could get Terrell disqualified. Danny and Terrell better keep their eyes on the ball if they hope to last the season. John Feinstein has been praised as “the best writer of sports books in America today” (The Boston Globe), and he proves it again in this fast-paced novel. “Thorough and suspenseful; a must-read for those interested in basketball and the dealings surrounding the sport.” —Kirkus Reviews, Starred

This step-by-step approach starts from the ground up, including: problems in the stance, pre-swing movements, hip rotation, the swing, and more.

We provide the first analysis of racial in-group bias in Type-I and Type-II errors. Using player-referee matched data from NBA games we show that there is no overall racial bias or in-group bias in foul calls made by referees. Similarly, there is no racial bias or in-group bias in Type-I errors (incorrect foul calls). On the other hand, there is significant in-group favoritism in Type-II errors. These are wrongful acquittals where the referee did not blow the whistle although a foul was committed. We also analyze peer effects and find that black referees' proclivity to make Type-II errors in favor of black players exists as long black referees have at least one black peer referee on the court, and that the bias disappears only if black referees have two white peers. In case of white referees, in-group favoritism in Type-II errors emerges if white referees have two black peers with them on the court. We provide evidence showing that the results are not attributable to skill differences between referees. We also show that a higher Type-I error rate during the season lowers referees' probability to be selected to officiate a game in the playoffs, whereas variations in the rate of Type-II errors have no impact on the likelihood of a playoff assignment. These results indicate that in-group favoritism takes place in a domain which is not costly (making Type-II errors), and that bias is eliminated when it is costly to the decisionmaker.