Offering a philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge, this text demonstrates how a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and luck can enable us to see past some of the most intractable disputes in the contemporary theory of knowledge.

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.

Epistemic Luckis the first book to offer a rigorous philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge. In particular, Duncan Pritchard shows how a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and luck can enable us to see our way past some of the most intractable disputes in the contemporary theory of knowledge. Anyone working on epistemology will need to come to terms with his original and incisive contribution to the field.

This book enriches our understanding of knowledge and Gettier's challenge, stimulating debate on a central epistemological issue.

This is the first volume of its kind to provide a curated collection of cutting-edge scholarship on the philosophy of luck Offers an in-depth examination of the concept of luck, which has often been overlooked in philosophical study Includes discussions of luck from a range of philosophical perspectives, including ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and cognitive science Examines the role of luck in core philosophical problems, such as free will Features work from the main philosophers writing on luck today

The problem of moral luck is that there is a contradiction in our common sense ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. For example, two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. We blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, because we believe that the killer driver is more blameworthy. Nevertheless, this idea contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person’s blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. Thus, our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy. In Defense of Moral Luck aims to make progress in resolving this contradiction. Hartman defends the claim that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstance, and character can partially determine the degree of a person’s blameworthiness. He also explains why there is a puzzle in our thinking about moral responsibility in the first place if luck often affects a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Furthermore, the book’s methodology provides a unique way to advance the moral luck debate with arguments from diverse areas in philosophy that do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions.

This book develops an inductive risk account of the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. The riskiness of different people’s methods for forming religious beliefs is shown central both to understanding fundamentalist orientation and to concerns that philosophers and theologians share for “ownership” of risk in people’s faith ventures.