Emissions taxes, tradeable emission permits and voluntary compliance policies are becoming the instruments of choice in controlling environmental problems at the national and international level. This text uses research in order to appraise their efficiency in varying market conditions.

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Market-based Approaches to Environmental Regulation reviews the economics literature of market-based environmental regulations and design issues for environmental taxes and cap-and-trade systems. It begins by reviewing the economics literature on the theory of market-based environmental regulations. It then goes on to cover design issues for environmental taxes and cap-and-trade systems. Market-based Approaches to Environmental Regulation also discusses the U.S. experience with a number of regulatory approaches that are commonly characterized as market-based and describes the mix of market and non-market instruments that characterize these policies. Market-based Approaches to Environmental Regulation will be of interest to all researchers and practitioners in the field of environmental regulation.

This textbook explains the main economic mechanisms behind energy markets and assesses how governments can implement policies to improve how these markets function. Adopting a micro-economic perspective, the book systematically analyses the various types of market failures on the electricity and gas markets as well as coal, oil, hydrogen and heat markets to identify government policies that can improve welfare. These shortcomings include the natural monopoly and the public-good character of energy infrastructures; market power resulting from inflexibility of supply and demand; international trade restrictions; negative externalities concerning the use of fossil energy; positive externalities concerning innovative new energy technologies; information asymmetries with regard to the product characteristics of energy commodities; and other public concerns, such as energy poverty. In turn, readers will learn about various measures that governments can use to address these market failures, including incentive regulation for electricity grids; international integration of wholesale energy markets; environmental regulatory measures like emissions trading schemes; subsidy schemes for new technologies; green-energy certificate schemes; and energy taxes. Given its scope, the book will appeal to upper-undergraduate and graduate students from various disciplines who want to learn more about the economics and regulation of energy systems and markets.

Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets provides a study of environmental regulation when energy markets are imperfectly competitive. This theoretical treatment focuses on three relevant cases of energy markets. First, the residential space heating sector where hybrid regulation such as taxation and emissions trading together are possible. Second, the electricity market where transactions are organized in the form of multi-period auctions. Third, namely natural gas (input) and electricity (output) markets where there is combined imperfect competition in vertical related energy markets. The development of free or low carbon technologies supported by energy policies, aiming at increasing security of supply, is also explored whilst considering competition policies that reduce market power in energy markets thus improving market efficiency. Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets discusses the key issues of whether imperfect competition can lessen the ability of environmental policy to reduce pollution and/or to minimize the cost of meeting environmental targets. Policymakers, analysts and researchers gain a thorough understanding of the performance of environmental policy from Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets leading to better design of simulation models of performance and costs of environmental regulation.

In a market subject to environmental regulation, a firm's strategic behavior affects the production and emissions decisions of all firms. If firms are regulated by a Pigouvian tax, changing emissions will not affect the marginal cost of polluting. However, under a tradable permits system, the polluters' decisions affect the permit price. This paper shows that this feedback effect may increase a strategic firm's output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased local pollution by approximately nine percent, and therefore, substantially reduced the price of the region's pollution permits. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been approximately seven percent greater.

øThe authors present an extensive survey of the empirical evidence on the determinants of environmental performance as well as the effects of environmental regulation on the costs of production, plant location, firm-level productivity, stock prices and