Relations between China and Russia have evolved dramatically since their first diplomatic contact, particularly during the twentieth century. During the past decade China and Russia have made efforts to strengthen bilateral ties and improve cooperation on a number of diplomatic fronts. The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation maintain exceptionally close and friendly relations, strong geopolitical and regional cooperation, and significant levels of trade. In The Future of China-Russia Relations, scholars from around the world explore the current state of the relationship between the two powers and assess the prospects for future cooperation and possible tensions in the new century. The contributors examine Russian and Chinese perspectives on a wide range of issues, including security, political relationships, economic interactions, and defense ties. This collection explores the energy courtship between the two nations and analyzes their interests and policies regarding Central Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan.

This book depicts the sophisticated relationship between Russia and China as a pragmatic one, a political “marriage of convenience”. Yet at the same time the relationship is stable, and will remain so. After all, bilateral relations are usually based on pragmatic interests and the pursuit of these interests is the very essence of foreign policy. And, as often happens in life, the most long-lasting marriages are those based on convenience. The highly complex, complicated, ambiguous and yet, indeed, successful relationship between Russia and China throughout the past 25 years is difficult to grasp theoretically. Russian and Chinese elites are hard-core realists in their foreign policies, and the neorealist school in international relations seems to be the most adequate one to research Sino-Russian relations. Realistically, throughout this period China achieved a multidimensional advantage over Russia. Yet, simultaneously Russia-China relations do not follow the patterns of power politics. Beijing knows its limits and does not go into extremes. Rather, China successfully seeks to build a longterm, stable relationship based on Chinese terms, where both sides gain, albeit China gains a little more. Russia in this agenda does not necessary lose; just gains a little less out of this asymmetric deal. Thus, a new model of bilateral relations emerges, which may be called – by paraphrasing the slogan of Chinese diplomacy – as “asymmetric win-win” formula. This model is a kind of “back to the past“ – a contemporary equivalent of the first model of Russia-China relations: the modus vivendi from the 17th century, achieved after the Nerchinsk treaty.

This report makes the point that in both Russia and China it is politics ââ¬" and not market or commercial considerations ââ¬" that largely drive energy relationships with each other and the outside world.à For both countries, energy and energy security is regarded as a strategic asset and/or objective that are at risk from outside forces.à The conditions that each state has attached to their energy policies ironically preclude the kind of easy cooperation seen in other strategic and political issues between Moscow and Beijing. In both Central and Northeast Asia, Russia has blocked Chinese efforts to realize its version of energy security, yet it has not been able to come up either with the resources or means for a coherent policy of supplying China with reliable quantities of energy that would lead China away from non-Russian producers.à The under-fulfilment of the potential for Russia to supply China will continue and continue as well to be a source of strain in their relationship.

Russia is the world's biggest hydrocarbon producer. China is one of the world's largest and fastest-growing energy markets. The two are neighbours. Yet their energy relationship is very thin. Instead, they compete for vast and largely unexplored Central Asian resources. As Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas start flowing to China, Russia's traditional dominance in the region is diminishing. However, the Central Asian states are not passive pawns in a new 'great game'. The EU and the US can help these countries to turn the new energy geopolitics to their advantage.

Fifteen years have passed since China and Russia formed a 'strategic cooperative partnership' in 1996, and 2011 marks the 10th anniversary of their 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. Considering the significant changes that have taken place in China and Russia over this period, it is well worth assessing the meaning of the China-Russia 'strategic partnership' and their declared 'good-neighbourly' relations. The 'strategic partnership' falls short of the aspirational official rhetoric of both sides. There are three common threads in the views of Chinese policymakers and analysts regarding the China-Russia partnership: pragmatism, lack of political trust and the US factor. While some of the grander expectations of China-Russia relations are unlikely to develop, the two countries will nevertheless avoid antagonizing one another and will find common interests in a stable relationship. The relationship may encounter tension over specific issues, but it is relatively resistant to long-term damage because of the pragmatism of both parties and the willingness to discuss differences behind closed doors. China and Russia will continue to be pragmatic partners of convenience, but not partners based on deeper shared world views and strategic interests. In the coming years, while relations will remain close at the diplomatic level, the two cornerstones of the partnership over the past two decades -- military and energy cooperation -- will continue to crumble. As a result, Russia's significance to China will continue to diminish.

​As China rises to global power status, its relations with other major powers, including Russia, are constantly renegotiated. Energy figures prominently in both countries’ foreign policy. An extensive analysis of Chinese language sources – academic debate 1997-2012 – confirms a collision of interests over Central Asian reserves. While unanimous appeals to compromise render previous predictions of impending confrontation unconvincing, descriptions of Sino-Central Asian energy relations as “central to energy security”, and the explicit rejection of a Russian “sphere of influence”, also exclude a retreat. In the long term, China will likely replace Russia as the dominant force in Central Asia’s energy sector, causing the Kremlin to perceive another “encroachment”. The current notion of a “strategic partnership” will inevitably be challenged.​