This text explores how self-consciousness and self-understanding differ phenomenologically from the experience and comprehension of others, and the extent to which such relations are constitutively interdependent. Jardine argues that Husserl’s analyses of selfhood and intersubjectivity are animated by the question of what's at stake in recognising an agent’s engagement as the situated response of a person, rather than simply as the comportment of an animal or living body. Drawing centrally from the freshly excavated Ideas II drafts and manuscripts, the author develops Husserl’s often fragmentary investigations of attention, habit, emotion, freedom, the common world, and action, and considers their implications for subjectivity and the experience of others. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person also brings Husserlian phenomenology into dialogue with twenty-first century philosophical concerns, from accounts of selfhood and agency from analytic philosophy to the treatment of social experience in critical theory. The book shows the reader that transcendental phenomenology can be rejuvenated by engaging with a broader philosophical landscape and will appeal to researchers, students, and instructors in the field.

New York Post Best Book of 2016 We often think of our capacity to experience the suffering of others as the ultimate source of goodness. Many of our wisest policy-makers, activists, scientists, and philosophers agree that the only problem with empathy is that we don’t have enough of it. Nothing could be farther from the truth, argues Yale researcher Paul Bloom. In AGAINST EMPATHY, Bloom reveals empathy to be one of the leading motivators of inequality and immorality in society. Far from helping us to improve the lives of others, empathy is a capricious and irrational emotion that appeals to our narrow prejudices. It muddles our judgment and, ironically, often leads to cruelty. We are at our best when we are smart enough not to rely on it, but to draw instead upon a more distanced compassion. Basing his argument on groundbreaking scientific findings, Bloom makes the case that some of the worst decisions made by individuals and nations—who to give money to, when to go to war, how to respond to climate change, and who to imprison—are too often motivated by honest, yet misplaced, emotions. With precision and wit, he demonstrates how empathy distorts our judgment in every aspect of our lives, from philanthropy and charity to the justice system; from medical care and education to parenting and marriage. Without empathy, Bloom insists, our decisions would be clearer, fairer, and—yes—ultimately more moral. Brilliantly argued, urgent and humane, AGAINST EMPATHY shows us that, when it comes to both major policy decisions and the choices we make in our everyday lives, limiting our impulse toward empathy is often the most compassionate choice we can make.

Empathy (Einfühlung)—as a crucial concept for understanding ourselves, others, and communities—was a central topic of interest in the first half of the twentieth century amongst philosophers and in the emerging sciences of psychology and sociology. Edith Stein’s dissertation and inaugural publication, On the Problem of Empathy, introduces her unique take on empathy, embodiment, phenomenology, and intersubjectivity. Her immersion in phenomenology and her intimate familiarity with the psychology and sociology of her day make it a challenge for contemporary readers to understand. This companion provides a guide to Stein’s first philosophical masterpiece. The opening essays, including a contribution from Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, indicate the most important influences on Stein’s thought circa 1917, the structure and method of her argument, the place of this work in her oeuvre, its historical significance, and its relevance for contemporary philosophical discussions. Timothy Burns then provides a clear and detailed summary of each section of Empathy, elucidating the argument that weaves through this classic of philosophical thought.

Neuronal Correlates of Empathy: From Rodent to Human explores the neurobiology behind emotional contagion, compassionate behaviors and the similarities in rodents and human and non-human primates. The book provides clear and accessible information that avoids anthropomorphisms, reviews the latest research from the literature, and is essential reading for neuroscientists and others studying behavior, emotion and empathy impairments, both in basic research and preclinical studies. Though empathy is still considered by many to be a uniquely human trait, growing evidence suggests that it is present in other species, and that rodents, non-human primates, and humans share similarities. Examines the continuum of behavioral and neurobiological responses between rodents—including laboratory rodents and monogamic species—and humans Contains coverage of humans, non-human primates, and the emerging area of rodent studies Explores the possibility of an integrated neurocircuitry for empathy

The Value of Empathy explores various approaches to understanding empathy and investigates its moral and practical role. The central role of empathy in understanding others, and the need for it in our social and inter-personal encounters, is widely acknowledged by philosophers, social scientists and psychologists alike. Discussions of empathy abound, not only in more specialised academic publications, but also in traditional and social media. Yet neither a clear understanding, nor a uniform definition of this relatively new term is available. Indeed, one difficulty in discussing empathy, in philosophy and beyond, is the profusion of definitions; the difficulty is compounded by a lack of clarity in the distinction between empathy and cognate concepts such as sympathy and compassion. This book has two aims: Chapters 1–5 seek to address the dual concerns of the lack of clarity and profusion of interpretations by suggesting new ways of approaching the topic. The second aim of the book is to connect the more abstract discussions of empathy with its normative functions. Chapters 6–8 engage with the theoretical concerns relevant to the ethics of empathy and raise interesting points about its significance in ethical thought and action. The final four chapters focus on the practical normative significance of empathy by examining the connections between empathy, vulnerability and care in circumstances of ill health. The chapters in this book were originally published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

Empathy is the process that allows us to share the feelings and emotions of others, in the absence of any direct emotional stimulation to the self. Humans can feel empathy for other people in a wide array of contexts: for basic emotions and sensation such as anger, fear, sadness, joy, pain and lust as well as for more complex emotions such as guilt, embarrassment and love. It has been proposed that, for most people, empathy is the process that prevents us doing harm to others. Although empathy seems to be an automatic response of the brain to others’ emotional reactions, there are circumstances under which we do not share the same feeling as others. Imagine, for example, that someone who does the same job as you is paid twice as much. In this case, that person might be very satisfied with their extra salary, but you would not share this satisfaction. This case illustrates the ubiquitous feeling of fairness and justice. Our sense of fairness has also become the focus of modern economic theories. In contrast to the prominent self-interest hypothesis of classic economy assuming that all people are exclusively motivated by their self-interest, humans are also strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences such as the concern for fairness and reciprocity. The notion of fairness is not only crucial in personal interaction with others in the context of families, workplace or interactions with strangers, but also guides people’s behaviour in impersonal economic and political domains. This book brings together work from a wide range of disciplines to explain processes underlying empathy and fairness. The expert contributors approach the topic of empathy and fairness from different viewpoints, namely those of social cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, evolutionary anthropology, economics and neuropathology. The result is an interdisciplinary and unitary framework focused on the neuronal, developmental, evolutionary and psychological basis of empathy and fairness. With its extensive discussions and the high calibre of the participants, this important new book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in this topic.

The diverse essays in this volume speak to the relevance of phenomenological and psychological questioning regarding perceptions of the human. This designation, human, can be used beyond the mere identification of a species to underwrite exclusion, denigration, dehumanization and demonization, and to set up a pervasive opposition in Othering all deemed inhuman, nonhuman, or posthuman. As alerted to by Merleau-Ponty, one crucial key for a deeper understanding of these issues is consideration of the nature and scope of perception. Perception defines the world of the perceiver, and perceptual capacities are constituted in engagement with the world – there is co-determination. Moreover, the distinct phenomenology of perception in the spectatorial mode in contrast to the reciprocal mode, deepens the intersubjective and ethical dimensions of such investigations. Questions motivating the essays include: Can objectification and an inhuman gaze serve positive ends? If so, under what constraints and conditions? How is an inhuman gaze achieved and at what cost? How might the emerging insights of the role of perception into our interdependencies and essential sociality from various domains challenge not only theoretical frameworks, but also the practices and institutions of science, medicine, psychiatry and justice? What can we learn from atypical social cognition, psychopathology and animal cognition? Could distortions within the gazer’s emotional responsiveness and habituated aspects of social interaction play a role in the emergence of an inhuman gaze? Perception and the Inhuman Gaze will interest scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and social cognition.