Policy makers and academics alike have mistakenly promoted an agenda which takes well-governed democratic and consolidated 'Weberian' states as the model for the world and the goal of development programs. Whilst Western industrial democracies are the exception, areas of limited statehood where state institutions are weak and ineffective, are everywhere, and, this books argues, can still be well-governed. Three factors explain effective governance in areas of limited statehood: Fair and transparent institutions 'fit for purpose,' legitimate governors accepted by the people, and social trust among the citizens. Effective and legitimate governance in the absence of a functioning state is not only provided by international organizations, foreign aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations but also by multi-national companies, rebel groups and other violent non-state actors, 'traditional' as well as religious leaders, and community-based organizations. Börzel and Risse base their argument on empirical findings from over a decade of research covering Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.

In 1947, British India-the part of South Asia that is today's India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh-emerged from the colonial era with the world's largest centrally managed canal irrigation infrastructure. However, as vividly illustrated by Tushaar Shah, the orderly irrigation economy that saved millions of rural poor from droughts and famines is now a vast atomistic system of widely dispersed tube-wells that are drawing groundwater without permits or hindrances. Taming the Anarchy is about the development of this chaos and the prospects to bring it under control. It is about both the massive benefit that the irrigation economy has created and the ill-fare it threatens through depleted aquifers and pollution. Tushaar Shah brings exceptional insight into a socio-ecological phenomenon that has befuddled scientists and policymakers alike. In systematic fashion, he investigates the forces behind the transformation of South Asian irrigation and considers its social, economic, and ecological impacts. He considers what is unique to South Asia and what is in common with other developing regions. He argues that, without effective governance, the resulting groundwater stress threatens the sustenance of the agrarian system and therefore the well being of the nearly one and a half billion people who live in South Asia. Yet, finding solutions is a formidable challenge. The way forward in the short run, Shah suggests, lies in indirect, adaptive strategies that change the conduct of water users. From antiquity until the 1960‘s, agricultural water management in South Asia was predominantly the affair of village communities and/or the state. Today, the region depends on irrigation from some 25 million individually owned groundwater wells. Tushaar Shah provides a fascinating economic, political, and cultural history of the development and use of technology that is also a history of a society in transition. His book provides powerful ideas and lessons for researchers, historians, and policy

Although the study of politics dates to ancient Greece, the basic questions that interested those earliest political scientists still linger with us today: What are the origins of government? What should government do? What conditions foster effective governance? Rational choice theory offers a new means for developing correctable answers to these questions. This volume illustrates the promise of rational choice theory and demonstrates how theory can help us develop interesting, fresh conclusions about the fundamental processes of politics. Each of the book’s three sections begins with a pedagogical overview that is accessible to those with little knowledge of rational choice theory. The first group of essays then discusses various ways in which rational choice contributes to our understanding of the foundations of government. The second set focuses on the contributions of rational choice theory to institutional analysis. The final group demonstrates ways in which rational choice theory helps to understand the character of popular government.

Democratic and consolidated states are taken as the model for effective rule-making and service provision. In contrast, this book argues that good governance is possible even without a functioning state.

This path-breaking book offers fresh insights into a perennial problem. At times, the absence of centralized international authority precludes attainment of common goals. Yet, at other times, nations realize mutual interests through cooperation under anarchy. Drawing on a diverse set of historical cases in security and economic affairs, the contributors to this special issue of World Politics not only provide a unified explanation of the incidence of cooperation and conflict, but also suggest strategies to promote the emergence of cooperation.

Challenges the democratic peace and diversionary war theories by emphasizing the importance of social trust, its origin as a by-product of effective governance exercised by strong states, and influence on international conflict.