The late 13th century witnessed the conquest of Wales after two hundred years of conflict between Welsh princes and the English crown. In 1282 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the only native Prince of Wales to be formally acknowledged by a King of England, was slain by English forces. His brother Dafydd continued the fight, but was eventually captured and executed. Further revolts followed under Rhys ap Maredudd, a former crown ally, and Madog ap Llywelyn, a kinsman of the defeated lords of Gwynedd. The Welsh wars were a massive undertaking for the crown, and required the mobilization of all resources. Edward’s willingness to direct the combined power of the English state and church against the Prince of Wales, to an unprecedented degree, resulted in a victory that had eluded all of his predecessors. This latest study of the Welsh wars of Edward I will draw upon recently translated archive material, allowing a fresh insight into military and political events. Edward’s personal relationship with Welsh leaders is also reconsidered. Traditionally, the conquest is dated to the fall of Llywelyn in December 1282, but this book will argue that Edward was not truly the master of Wales until 1294. In the years between those two dates he broke the power of the great Marcher lords and crushed two further large-scale revolts against crown authority. After 1294 he was able to exploit Welsh manpower on a massive scale. His successors followed the same policy during the Scottish wars and the Hundred Years War. Edward enjoyed considerable support among the ‘uchelwyr’ or Welsh gentry class, many of whom served him as diplomats and spies as well as military captains. This aspect of the king’s complex relationship with the Welsh will also feature.

The late 13th century witnessed the conquest of Wales after two hundred years of conflict between Welsh princes and the English crown. In 1282 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the only native Prince of Wales to be formally acknowledged by a King of England, was slain by English forces. His brother Dafydd continued the fight, but was eventually captured and executed. Further revolts followed under Rhys ap Maredudd, a former crown ally, and Madog ap Llywelyn, a kinsman of the defeated lords of Gwynedd. The Welsh wars were a massive undertaking for the crown, and required the mobilization of all resources. Edward’s willingness to direct the combined power of the English state and church against the Prince of Wales, to an unprecedented degree, resulted in a victory that had eluded all of his predecessors. This latest study of the Welsh wars of Edward I will draw upon recently translated archive material, allowing a fresh insight into military and political events. Edward’s personal relationship with Welsh leaders is also reconsidered. Traditionally, the conquest is dated to the fall of Llywelyn in December 1282, but this book will argue that Edward was not truly the master of Wales until 1294. In the years between those two dates he broke the power of the great Marcher lords and crushed two further large-scale revolts against crown authority. After 1294 he was able to exploit Welsh manpower on a massive scale. His successors followed the same policy during the Scottish wars and the Hundred Years War. Edward enjoyed considerable support among the ‘uchelwyr’ or Welsh gentry class, many of whom served him as diplomats and spies as well as military captains. This aspect of the king’s complex relationship with the Welsh will also feature.

A study of medieval warfare and a formative event in the history of Britain. Edward I’s conquest of Wales has not been the subject of a scholarly book for over a century. Research has advanced since then, changing our perception of the medieval military mind and shining fresh light on the key characters involved in the conquest. That is why Sean Davies’s absorbing new study is so timely and important. Taking a balanced approach, he gives both the Welsh and English perspectives on the war and on the brutal, mistrustful, and ruthless personal motives that drove events. His account is set in the context of Welsh warfare and society from the end of Rome to the time of Edward’s opening campaign in the late thirteenth century. The narrative describes in vivid detail the military history of the conflict; the sequence of campaigns; Welsh resistance; Edward’s castle building and English colonization; the cost of the struggle to the Welsh and the English; and the uneasy peace that followed.

This study of Edward I's governance radically re-evaluates his motivations and achievements, presenting an entirely new interpretation of his reign.

The Anglo-French war of 1294-1303 has not been the subject of a major study since the early 1900s. Recent histories tend to treat it as a sideshow compared to Edward I's wars in Wales and Scotland, which gives a false impression. In reality the Welsh and Scottish campaigns were distractions, and Edward regarded the war against France as his main focus. The main issue at stake was the defence and recovery of Aquitaine, the last substantial piece of the so-called 'Angevin empire'. To that end Edward spent enormous sums of money on recruiting allies in the Low Countries and the Holy Roman Empire. His rival, Philip IV, also recruited allies to counter Edward, until the conflict engulfed much of Western Europe. The result was a series of military stalemates, demonstrating that neither England nor France could achieve outright victory in a head-to-head conflict. There were plenty of bloody incidents and much hard fighting: the hanging of Gascon prisoners from the walls of Rions in 1295, for instance, or the epic thirteen-week siege of Saint Sever. David Pilling places the war in its proper context and argues it was a vital step on the road to the more famous conflict we remember as the Hundred Years War.