Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation discusses the national economic policy and economics as a policy-oriented science. This book summarizes what economists do and do not know about the inflation and recession that affected the U.S. economy during the years of the Great Stagflation in the mid-1970s. The topics discussed include the basic concepts of stagflation, turbulent economic history of 1971-1976, anatomy of the great recession and inflation, and legacy of the Great Stagflation. The relation of wage-price controls, fiscal policy, and monetary policy to the Great Stagflation is also elaborated. This publication is beneficial to economists and students researching on the history of the Great Stagflation and policy errors of the 1970s.

Monograph using economic theory to analyse errors in economic policy leading to economic recession and inflation in the USA during 1971 to 1976 - outlines basic concepts of stagflation such as aggregate supply and demand analysis and the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, examines recession dynamics (productivity, consumption and investment problems) and effects of rising prices, and presents economic analysis of wages-price controls, fiscal policy and monetary policy. Bibliography pp. 219 to 223 and graphs.

Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources, thereby raising productivity. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and ’80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations, and which propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. In the decades since, the immediate cause of the period’s rise in inflation has been the subject of considerable debate. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Here, contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on the ways in which the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today’s global and increasingly complex economic environment.

Leading economists discuss post–financial crisis policy dilemmas, including the dangers of complacency in a period of relative stability. The Great Depression led to the Keynesian revolution and dramatic shifts in macroeconomic theory and macroeconomic policy. Similarly, the stagflation of the 1970s led to the adoption of the natural rate hypothesis and to a major reassessment of the role of macroeconomic policy. Should the financial crisis and the Great Recession lead to yet another major reassessment, to another intellectual revolution? Will it? If so, what form should it, or will it, take? These are the questions taken up in this book, in a series of contributions by policymakers and academics. The contributors discuss the complex role of the financial sector, the relative roles of monetary and fiscal policy, the limits of monetary policy to address financial stability, the need for fiscal policy to play a more active role in stabilization, and the relative roles of financial regulation and macroprudential tools. The general message is a warning against going back to precrisis ways—to narrow inflation targeting, little use of fiscal policy for stabilization, and insufficient financial regulation. Contributors David Aikman, Alan J. Auerbach, Ben S. Bernanke, Olivier Blanchard, Lael Brainard, Markus K. Brunnermeier, Marco Buti, Benoît Cœuré, Mario Draghi, Barry Eichengreen, Jason Furman, Gita Gopinath, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Andrew G. Haldane, Philipp Hildebrand, Marc Hinterschweiger, Sujit Kapadia, Nellie Liang, Adam S. Posen, Raghuram Rajan, Valerie Ramey, Carmen Reinhart, Dani Rodrik, Robert E. Rubin, Jay C. Shambaugh, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Jeremy C. Stein, Lawrence H. Summers

Discussion of profit sharing as a means of combating cyclical unemployment and inflation (stagflation) in market economies - argues that profit sharing will produce full employment without inducing inflation; discusses marginal value economic theory of wages and its effect on the labour market; briefly examines advantages of profit sharing, employee Motivation, etc., and the need for accompanying tax reform. Bibliography.

This book sets forth both a theory and a comparative empirical analysis of stagflation, that peculiar combination of high unemployment, slow growth, and spurts of high inflation bedeviling the advanced industrial nations during the past fifteen years. The authors first construct a small macroeconomic model that takes full account of aggregate demand and supply forces in the determination of output, employment, and the price level, in both a single-economy and a multi-economy setting. They then apply the model to provide an understanding of comparative performance of industrial countries in the areas of unemployment, inflation, productivity, and investment growth. They argue convincingly that the decay of the major economies during this period resulted from the supply shocks of the 1970s, such as the two major OPEC oil-price increases, and from the consequent policy-induced decrease in demand in response to inflationary pressures. Their analysis differs markedly from similar studies in that it takes specific account of institutional differences in the labor markets of the various economies. This helps to explain in particular the divergent adjustment profiles of the United States and Europe. Bruno and Sachs make several key recommendations for the mix of demand management and incomes policies necessary to combat stagflation in individual countries as well as for the coordination of macroeconomic policies among the major industrial nations.