Introduction -- The fundamental tension -- Taming the hierarchy -- Forging the political terrain -- The developing world: two examples -- The use of power -- Conclusion

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description.

This text presents an integrated theory of social oppression, which tackles the fundamental question: if there is no natural hierarchy among humans, why are some cases of oppression so persistent? It argues that the explanation lies in the coercive co-opting of the oppressed to join in their own oppression.

As the challenge of preventing military conflict has become increasingly complex in the post-Cold War era, economic sanctions are being applied with growing frequency. Sanctions are also being used to enforce international law, to deter aggression and terrorism, to defend democracy and human rights, and to prevent nuclear proliferation. This study addresses questions about the utility, appropriateness and success or failure of sanctions, as well as their impact on the poor and innocent. Specific case studies, focusing on recent conflicts such as those in Haiti, Iraq, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate the principal aspects of economic sanctions.