This definitive study of electoral politics and democratic decentralization in provincial Thailand investigates how democracy is unfolding in the context of emergent capitalism, exploring the relationships between the politics of the locality, the province and the nation from 1950.

Most studies of Southeast Asian economic change focus on the phenomenal growth experienced by a few large cities, such as Jakarta, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. Big business has been viewed as the economic engine fueling the region's growth and prosperity. Studies of the rural areas have concerned themselves with the social and environmental impact of metropolitan growth--villages emptied by migration to the big cities, cultures crushed by tourist development, and agribusiness and lush landscapes destroyed by the devastation of natural resources. The literature reveals that few analysts have examined the middle distance between metropolis and countryside. The contributors to this book have addressed the issue by concentrating on the intermediate level of economic, political, and social life--the world of Thailand's provincial cities and market towns. In the past decade the rise of frequently violent competition for business and political leadership in the Thai provinces, and the growing importance of provincial support for national powerholders, has drawn attention to the way in which these town and village centers are being transformed by capitalist development. This volume brings together some of the research inspired by this, drawing on a variety of disciplinary approaches, national backgrounds, and sites of study. Contributors: Daniel Arghiros, Chris Baker, Sombat Chantornvong, Kevin Hewison, Jim LoGerfo, Ruth McVey, Michael J. Montesano, James Ockey, Pasuk Phongpaichit, Maniemai Thongyou, Yoko Ueda.

The revised edition of Southeast Asia provides a grounded account of how people in the region are responding to - and being affected by - the changes sweeping through the region.

Why do some small, developing countries industrialize and others don’t? What factors account for different economic performance among states that are vulnerable to external shocks, crony capitalism, and political instability? This book argues that the answer lies in the structuring of state power, specifically the way different sets of governing elites – political leaders and economic technocrats – are embedded in political organisations and state institutions, and the way these elites relate to each other in the economic development policy process. Conducting a comparative historical analysis of Thailand and the Philippines, the book argues that the institutional settings of governing elites influence economic outcomes. In Thailand, political power traditionally connects to state institutions in ways that has limited the impact of political turnovers and global downturns - conducive to long-term industrial activities. In contrast, Philippine state power derives from family networks that merge social and political power, suited to fast-moving, short-term commercial interests. In focusing on this political and institutional story, the author analyses the current development dilemmas of countries, weighed down by historical legacies of unstable regimes, dependency, and social conflict, and how they are likely to develop in the future.

Why have Taiwan, rich parts of China, and Thailand boomed famously, while the Philippines has long remained stagnant both economically and politically? Do booms abet democracy? Does the rise of middle “classes” promise future liberalization? Why has Philippine democracy brought no boom and barely served the Filipino people? This book, unlike previous books, shows that both the roots and results of growth are largely political, not just economic. Specifically, it pays attention to local, not just national, power networks that caused or prevented growth in the aforementioned countries. Violence has been common in these politics, along with money. Elections have contributed to socio-political problems that are also obvious in Leninist or junta regimes, because elections are surprisingly easy to buy with corrupt money from government contracts. Liberals should pay more serious theoretical attention to the effects of money on justice, and Western political science should focus more clearly on the ways non-state local power affects elections. By considering the role of local money and power (above all, from small- and medium-sized firms that emerged after agrarian reforms) on elections and justice, this book asks democrats squarely to face the extent to which electoral procedures have failed to help ordinary citizens. Students and scholars of Asia will all need this book — as will students of the West whose methods have become parochial.

"An examination of how dictators and democrats in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand built and sustained pro-growth political coalitions"--