In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability--the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e. deliberative accountability)--this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.

In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability—the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e. deliberative accountability)—this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.

In twenty years, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association has organized six study groups of members of Commonwealth Parliaments to discuss various topics of interest and importance and, in most cases, reports or books have been the outcome of these meetings. Following on from the 1995 CPA conference on Parliament and People - making democratic institutions more representative, responsible and relevant, the executive Committee of the CPA decided to establish another study group on the functioning of committees in Commonwealth Parliaments with a view to recommending ways in which committee systems can enhance the performance and public perception of Parliament and Parliamentarians. This volume is a compilation of the findings and recommendations of this study and is intended as a resource for students of Parliament, as well as practitioners of the art of politics throughout the Commonwealth.

The first comprehensive account of the booming phenomenon of deliberative mini-publics, this book offers a systematic review of their variety, discusses their weaknesses, and recommends ways to make them a viable component of democracy. The book takes stock of the diverse practices of deliberative mini-publics and, more concretely, looks at preconditions, processes, and outcomes. It provides a critical assessment of the experience with mini-publics; in particular their lack of policy impact. Bringing together leading scholars in the field, notably James S Fishkin and Mark E Warren, Deliberative Mini-Publics will speak to anyone with an interest in democracy and democratic innovations.

A major new statement of deliberative theory that shows how states, even transnational systems, can be deliberatively democratic.

Based on unprecedented access to the UK Parliament, this book challenges how we understand and think about accountability between government and Parliament. Drawing on three months of research in Westminster, and over forty-five interviews, this book focuses on the everyday practices of Members of Parliament and officials to reveal how parliamentarians perform their scrutiny roles. Some MPs become specialists while others act as lone wolves; some are there to try to defend their party while others want to learn about policy. Amongst these different styles, chairs of committees have to try to reconcile these interpretations and either act as committee-orientated catalysts or attempt to impose order as leadership-orientated chieftains. All of this pushes and pulls scrutiny in competing directions, and tells us that accountability depends on individual beliefs, everyday practices and the negotiation of dilemmas. In this way, MPs and officials create a drama or spectacle of accountability and use their performance on the parliamentary stage to hold government to account. Dramas at Westminster: Select committees and the quest for accountability offers the most up-to-date and detailed research on committee practices in the House of Commons, following a range of reforms since 2010.

Undersøgelse af parlamentsmandatet baseret på svar på IPU-spørgeskema fra 134 parlamenter. Svarene er sammenlignet systematisk med de respektive forfatninger, lovgivning og parlamentsforretningsordener.