The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers. Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis-resolution framework that ensures commitment.

An intelligent analysis of the dangers, opportunities, and consequences of global sovereign debt Sovereign debt is growing internationally at a terrifying rate, as nations seek to prop up their collapsing economies. One only needs to look at the sovereign risk pressures faced by Greece, Spain, and Ireland to get an idea of how big this problem has become. Understanding this dilemma is now more important than ever, that's why Robert Kolb has compiled Sovereign Debt. With this book as your guide, you'll gain a better perspective on the essential issues surrounding sovereign debt and default through discussions of national defaults, systemic risk, associated costs, and much more. Historical studies are also included to provide a realistic framework of reference. Contains up-to-date research and analysis on sovereign debt from today's leading practitioners and academics Details the dangers of defaults and their associated systemic risks Explores the past, present, and future of sovereign debt The repercussions of a national default are all-encompassing as global markets are intricately interwoven in the modern world. Sovereign Debt examines what it will take to overcome the challenges of this market and how you can deal with the uncertainty surrounding it.

Developing country debt crises have been a recurrent phenomenon over the past two centuries. In recent times sovereign debt insolvency crises in developing and emerging economies peaked in the 1980s and, again, from the middle 1990s to the start of the new millennium. Despite the fact that several developing countries now have stronger economic fundamentals than they did in the 1990s, sovereign debt crises will reoccur again. The reasons for this are numerous, but the central one is that economic fluctuations are inherent features of financial markets, the boom and bust nature of which intensify under liberalized financial environments that developing countries have increasingly adopted since the 1970s. Indeed, today we are in the midst of an almost unprecedented global "bust." The timing of the book is important. The conventional wisdom is that the international economic and financial system is broken. Policymakers in both the poorest and the richest countries are likely to seriously consider how to restructure the international trade and financial system, including how to resolve sovereign debt crises in a more effective and fair manner. This book calls for the international reform of sovereign debt workouts which derives from both economic theory and real-world experiences. Country case studies underline the point that we need to do better. This book recognizes that the politics of the international treatment of sovereign debt have not supported systemic reform efforts thus far; however, failure in the past does not preclude success in the future in an evolving international political environment, and the book thus puts forth alternative reform ideas for consideration.

There is an obvious need to learn more about why some countries succeed and others fail when dealing with debt crises. Why do some sovereign debtors overcome economic problems very quickly and at minor human rights costs for their people, while others remain trapped by debts for years struggling with overwhelming debt burdens and exacerbating economic problems and human suffering? This book analyzes fourteen unique or singular country cases of sovereign debt problems that differ characteristically from the 'ordinary' debtor countries, and have not yet received enough or proper attention - some regarded as successful, some as unsuccessful in dealing with debt crises. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the policy options available to countries struggling with debt problems, or how to resolve a debt overhang while protecting human rights, the Rule of Law and the debtor's economic recovery.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

Even after one of the most severe multi-year crises on record in the advanced economies, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that high-income countries are completely different from their emerging market counterparts. The current phase of the official policy approach is predicated on the assumption that debt sustainability can be achieved through a mix of austerity, forbearance and growth. The claim is that advanced countries do not need to resort to the standard toolkit of emerging markets, including debt restructurings and conversions, higher inflation, capital controls and other forms of financial repression. As we document, this claim is at odds with the historical track record of most advanced economies, where debt restructuring or conversions, financial Repression, and a tolerance for higher inflation, or a combination of these were an integral part of the resolution of significant past debt overhangs.