This open access book explores Asian approaches towards investment arbitration—a transnational procedure to resolve disputes between a foreign investor and a host state—setting it in the wider political economy and within domestic law contexts. It considers the extent to which significant states in Asia are, or could become, “rule makers” rather than “rule takers” regarding corruption and serious illegality in investor-state arbitration. Corruption and illegality in international investment are widely condemned in any society, but there remains a lack of consensus on the consequences, especially in investment arbitration. A core issue addressed is whether a foreign investor violating a host state’s law should be awarded protection of its investment, as per its contract with the host state and/or the applicable investment or trade agreement between the home state and the host state. Some suggest such protection would be unnecessary as the investor committed a crime in the host state, while others attempt to establish an equilibrium between the investor and the host state. Others claim to protect investment, invoking the sanctity of promises made. The book starts with a deep dive into economic and legal issues in corruption and investment arbitration and then explores the situation and issues in major countries in the region in detail. It is a useful reference point for lawyers, economists, investors, and government officials who are seeking comprehensive and up-to-date information on anti-bribery rules in Asian investment treaties. It is of particular interest to students and researchers in economics, finance, and law, who are undertaking new research relating to the multifaceted impacts of corruption.

This book offers an exciting overview of how the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism currently deals with allegations and/or evidence of fraud and corruption. It provides a detailed analysis of the legal framework under which arbitral tribunals usually operate in investment disputes involving allegations of illegality. Readers will find step-by-step examinations of the corruption and fraud arguments employed by arbitral tribunals in ten landmark ISDS cases, followed by a chapter summarizing the status quo on the topic. The final part of the book discusses the identified challenges of addressing illegality issues in investment arbitration and potential solutions, including the creation of a multilateral investment court.

In Addressing Corruption Allegations in International Arbitration, Brody K. Greenwald and Jennifer A. Ivers draw upon their experience in international arbitrations involving allegations of corruption to provide a comprehensive overview of the key issues that arise in these high-stakes cases.

This is the first comprehensive study of corruption in international investment arbitration. The book considers the limited effectiveness of efforts to combat transnational corruption in international law and the emergence of international investment arbitration as a singular means foreffective control of corruption within the international legal order. The case law on corruption by investment tribunals is studied exhaustively, jurisprudential trends are identified, and reforms aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and fairness of investment arbitration as a mechanism to combatcorruption are proposed.Divided into three parts, part I focus on the phenomenon of corruption in foreign investment and attempts at its control through international law. Part II analyses the available case law in international investment arbitration dealing with corruption. Llamzon identifies nine distinct trendsemerging from the case law and provides a table summarizing the key areas of corruption decision-making and each relevant tribunal's approach, which is an invaluable tool for practitioners engaging in "live" issues of corruption within arbitral proceedings. Part III reflects on the implications ofthese trends for both the "supply" and "demand" sides of corruption in international law, and proposes a integrative framework of decision for corruption issues in international investment arbitration.

The Impact of Corruption on "Gateway Issues" of Arbitrability, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Procedural Issues /Yas Banaiftemi --On Corruption's Peremptory Treatment in International Arbitration /Aloysius P. Llamzon --Corruption Issues in the Jurisdictional Phase of Investment Arbitrations /Hiroyuki Tezuka --Standards of Proof for Allegations of Corruption in International Arbitration /Vladimir Kvhalei --Proving Corruption in International Arbitration /Andrea J. Menaker and Brody K. Greenwald --Corruption and Arbitration /Sébastien Besson --Addressing Allegations and Findings of Corruption /Nassib G. Ziadé --Corruption in Arbitration /Thomas K. Sprange QC --Arbitrators' Investigative and Reporting Rights and Duties on Corruption /Edoardo Marcenaro --The Common Law Consequences and Effects of Allegations or a Positive Finding of Corruption /Matthew Gearing QC and Roanna Kwong --The Effects of a Positive Finding of Corruption /Juan Fernández-Armesto --Raising Corruption as a Defence in Investment Arbitration /Sophie Nappert --Consequences and Effects of Allegations or of a Positive Finding of Corruption /Carita Wallgren-Lindholm --Concluding Remarks: Corruption and International Arbitration /Richard Kreindler.

This article examines the use of "unclean hands" and corruption as a defense in international investment arbitration using the infamous World Duty Free v Kenya arbitration in 2006 as a lens. By allowing for corruption to act as a complete defense, even when the "unclean hands" were on the part of both sides, allows for host States to be effectively rewarded for their corruption leaving the investor with their investment taken away and no recourse. How is it equitable to allow a State, whose illegal actions are more serious, to dismiss an investor's claim because of a comparatively minor illegality which was solicited from them? If two parties can act immorally and illegally in concluding a contract, there is merit to the argument that no court should aid one whose cause of action is based on an immoral or illegal act, ex dolo malo non oritur action. But corruption cases in investor-state disputes are rarely so black and white. This article proposes a paradigm shift to account for a more balanced approach.