Robert J. Howell offers a new account of the relationship between conscious experience and the physical world, based on a neo-Cartesian notion of the physical and careful consideration of three anti-materialist arguments. His theory of subjective physicalism reconciles the data of consciousness with the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.

This thought-provoking work offers a profound scholarly examination of how the process of objectification has come to limit our scientific and philosophical views of reality. The author proposes a new self-reflective interdisciplinary science of consciousness.

In this study of Hegel's philosophy, Brinkmann undertakes to defend Hegel's claim to objective knowledge by bringing out the transcendental strategy underlying Hegel's argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic. Hegel's metaphysical commitments are shown to become moot through this transcendental reading. Starting with a survey of current debates about the possibility of objective knowledge, the book next turns to the original formulation of the transcendental argument in favor of a priori knowledge in Kant's First Critique. Through a close reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Hegel's critique of it, Brinkmann tries to show that Hegel develops an immanent critique of Kant's position that informs his reformulation of the transcendental project in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the formulation of the position of 'objective thought' in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Brinkmann takes the reader through the strategic junctures of the argument of the Phenomenology that establishes the position of objective thinking with which the Logic begins. A critical examination of the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy shows that Hegel's metaphysical doctrine of the self-externalization of spirit need not compromise the ontological project of the Logic and thus does not burden the position of objective thought with pre-critical metaphysical claims. Brinkmann's book is a remarkable achievement. He has given us what may be the definitive version of the transcendental, categorial interpretation of Hegel. He does this in a clear approachable style punctuated with a dry wit, and he fearlessly takes on the arguments and texts that are the most problematic for this interpretation. Throughout the book, he situates Hegel firmly in his own context and that of contemporary discussion." -Terry P. Pinkard, University Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA "Klaus Brinkmann’s important Hegel study reads the Phenomenology and the Logic as aspects of a single sustained effort, in turning from categories to concepts, to carry Kant’s Copernican turn beyond the critical philosophy in what constitutes a major challenge to contemporary Cartesianism." - Tom Rockmore, McAnulty College Distinguished Professor, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA "In this compelling reconstruction of the theme of objective thought, Klaus Brinkmann takes the reader through Hegel’s dialectic with exceptional philosophical acumen.... Many aspects of this book are striking: the complete mastery of the central tenets of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy, the admirable clarity in treating obscure texts and very difficult problems, and how Brinkmann uses his expertise for a discussion of the problems of truth, objectivity and normativity relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate. This will prove to be a very important book, one that every serious student of Kant and Hegel will have to read." - Alfredo Ferrarin, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way, but at the same time each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world. Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life, and death.

Sebastian Rödl undermines a foundational dogma of contemporary philosophy: that knowledge, in order to be objective, must be knowledge of something that is as it is, independent of being known to be so. This profound work revives the thought that knowledge, precisely on account of being objective, is self-knowledge: knowledge knowing itself.

Consciousness lies at the core of being human. Therefore, to understand ourselves, we need a theory of consciousness. In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that prevents it from ever being explained. Consequently, philosophical debates over materialism and dualism are a waste of time. Scientific explanations of consciousness fare no better. Scientists do study consciousness, and such investigations will continue to grow and advance. However, none of them will ever reveal what consciousness is. In addition, given the centrality of consciousness in philosophy, Dietrich and Hardcastle claim that philosophy itself needs to change. That the central problems of philosophy persist is actually a profound epistemic fact about humans. Philosophy, then, is a limit to what humans can understand. (Series A)

Colin McGinn presents work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays which extend and deepen his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable.