In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

"This reprint of the 1942 English translation of Douhet's works, while titled Command of the Air, actually consists of five separate works: the original 1921 edition of Command of the Air, a second edition of 1927, a 1928 monograph titled 'Probable Aspects of Future War', a polemical article of 1929 called 'Recapitulation,' and the 1930 study 'The War of 19-.' The volume is reprinted by the Office of Air Force History as part of Project Warrior. By transporting ourselves back to the 1920s, past not only the Vietnam and Korean Wars, but nearly two decades before World War II, we become silent observers of the unfolding drama of airpower's history. Knowing that transpired after Douhet wrote, we can test our understanding, find the assumptions and conclusions of Douhet that proved false, and read with wonder those that proved true. Some of what he wrote today seems almost timeless, 'principles' perhaps of the employment of aircraft in war. Giulio Douhet was a prophet. From the perspective of today, he still bears pondering. Serious thinking about the nature of war and the role of aerospace power will not in our lifetime cease to be of value." -- Abstract.

This widely praised study draws from both American and German sources to show how the U.S. Army Air Forces cleared the way for the successful Allied invasion of France. In 1944 a revitalized American leadership abandoned the unsuccessful approach of strategic bombing and instead focused on air superiority, practically chasing the enemy out of the sky and eliminating Germany's supply of trained pilots. Examining the people, technologies, command decisions, and key events of the war over Germany, the authors prove conclusively that the winning of air superiority -- not the success of strategic bombing -- played a more essential part in the Allied victory in Europe

Bomber combat crews faced a wide array of perils as they flew over German territory. Bursts of heavy flak could tear the wings from their planes in a split second. Flaming bullets from German fighter planes could explode their fuel tanks, cut their oxygen supplies, destroy their engines. Thousands of young men were shot, blown up, or thrown from their planes five miles above the earth; and even those who returned faced the subtler dangers of ice and fog as they tried to land their battered aircraft back home.The winter of 1944 was the most dangerous time to be a combat airman in RAF Bomber Command. The chances of surviving a tour were as low as one in five, and morale had finally hit rock bottom. In this comprehensive history of the air war that year, Kevin Wilson describes the most dangerous period of the Battle of Berlin, and the unparalleled losses over Magdeburg, Leipzig and Nuremberg.Men of Air reveals how these ordinary men coped with the extraordinary pressure of flying, the loss of their colleagues, and the threat of death or capture. Brilliantly placing these stories within the context of The Great Escape, D-Day, the defeat of the V1 menace, and more, Wilson shows how the sheer grit and determination of these "Men of Air" finally turned the tide against the Germans.

This work examines whether "centralized control and decentralized execution" is a valid doctrinal tenet, given the technological advances in the information age. Fascinating scenarios from recent operations, set in the context of a "complex air operations system," show the dilemmas presented by participants' increased access to information-and the resulting consequences of their decisions. With the uncertainty of war and the blending of diverse organizations, the author illustrates that commanders must balance empowerment with accountability by developing depth in command relationships among their subordinates. Orginally published in 2007.

Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day. Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force’s internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC’s mission. In order to prepare SAC’s “warriors” to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world’s most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its “culture” until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.