(Dover thrift editions).

The history of the United States in the last thirty years, its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and the devastating affects of that war on the psyche of this nation is evidence of a foreign policy tragedy. Foreign policy tragedy brings domestic tragedy in its wake. The purpose of this study is to work out why the approaches to social revolution--and that is what the Vietnam War was about--have been wrong on both sides of the ideological spectrum the last thirty years in the U.S., point out why they were wrong, point to where they were wrong, and point to the consequences of acting in a society when the perceptions are in certain respects wrong. Let me sum up my perception on what went wrong in Vietnam. It was a Right wing war fought on Left wing premises. It was a war that could not have been won because those who designed it would not or could not win it--but were also afraid of losing it. It was a war that was wrongly perceived by both sides of the ideological spectrum. The Liberal argument was that America tried everything and still' lost it! The Conservative argument was that it could have been won if the opposition had not tied their hands, keeping them from an all out effort that would have been required to win it. The war was started in earnest by the Liberals under Kennedy. The strategy was to roll up the enemy by hitting on the peasant and through it, cut off the leaders. Pacification, education, re-education, indoctrination, and the introduction of self-defense' techniques to the South Vietnamese peasants was meant to stop the revolution exported from the North in its tracks. The U.S. policy was predicated on the assumption that the peasants really had something to do with the ruling functions of the North Vietnamese revolution after Thermidor; that after the onset of Thermidor--after the institutionalization' of the revolution--in Hanoi, the revolution' was still revolution. The Liberal' approach has believed that revolution is tantamount to Mao's view of it in China--peasants all immersed in the revolutionary process as fish in the sea'. And so you would have to drain the very ocean itself to stop it. Our' approach to the post revolutionary process is that after' the onset of Thermidor in a society, revolution' is a bunch of terror informed super bureaucrats at the center' of a society increasingly cut off from the periphery. In a post revolutionary society, it is the leaders that matter--not the fish in the sea'. So bombing the small fish' into fish soup hell in response--as did the West' in Vietnam in that war--every tree, every outhouse, every shack, and every village, until they drop so much ordinance that the entire region is brain dead from defoliants and pockmarks and natural calamities, while leaving the center' untouched, would seem insane. Yet that was the policy in Vietnam of America. And then nothing happened! Nothing happened week after week, year after year except that America itself was being driven mad doing the same thing, and expecting it to come out different. That, as the President-elect said in 1993, was and is insanity. But what choice did they all have? The pro-war liberal American leadership that designed the war in Vietnam did not dare bomb Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam, for fear of triggering World War III with Red China and with Soviet Russia--both of whose client North Vietnam was. So they tied their own hands, figuring that by coming through the back door, fish in the sea' style, piece by piece, nobody will notice in China and Russia; ergo no World War III. So they took a strategy that was insane, and made a virtue out of its necessity. They tied their own hand! And then they blamed the opposition for forcing them to fight with their hands tied behind their backs. On the other h

A major bestseller in Italy, Paul Ginsborg's account of this most recent and dynamic period in Italy's history is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand contemoprary Italy. Ginsborg chronicles a period that witnessed a radical transformation in the country's social, economic and political landscape, creating a fascinating and definitve account of how Italy has coped or failed to cope as it moves from one century to the next. With particular emphasis on its role in italian life, work and culture Ginsborg shows how smaller families, longer lives and greater generation crossover have had significant effects on Italian society. Ginsborg looks at the 2000 elections, the influence of the Mafia, the decline of both Communism and Catholicism, and the change in national identity. This is modern history at its best.

In this long-awaited book (already a major bestseller in Italy) Ginsborg has created a fascinating, sophisticated and definitive account of how Italy has coped, or failed to cope, with the past two decades. Contemporary Italy strongly mirrors Britain - the countries have roughly the same extent, population size and GNP - and yet they are fantastically different. Ginsborg sees this difference as most fundamentally clear in the role of the family and it is the family which is at the heart of Italian politics and business. Anyone wishing to understand contemporary Italy will find it essential to have this enormously attractive and intelligent book.

Contributors from philosophy and political science discuss the observation that civility, civic virtue, tolerance, and socio-cultural unity have declined while exploring the nature of civil society, the conflict between individual liberty and the common good, and the role of law and government policy in weaving the threads of the social fabric. From publisher description.

The Turkey of today little resembles that of recent decades. Its economy has expanded hugely, new political elites have emerged, and the once powerful Kemalist military is no longer a potent and dominant political player. Meanwhile, new prosperity has had many unexpected social and politicalrepercussions, pre-eminent among which is the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which first came to power in 2002 by downplaying its Islamist leanings and marketing itself as a center-right party.After several terms in office, and amid unprecedented popularity, the conduct of the AKP and its leading cadres has faced growing criticism. Turkey has yet to solve its Kurdish question, and its foreign policy is increasingly under threat as it balances relations with Iran, Israel, Iraq and Russia,to name only a few of its more demanding interlocutors. Widespread domestic protests gripped the country in 2013. The government is now perceived by many to be corrupt, unaccountable, intimidating of the press and intolerant of alternative political views and criticism. Has this once promisingdemocracy descended into a tyranny of the majority led by a charismatic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan? Is Turkey more polarized now than ever in its recent history? These are among the questions posed in this timely primer on a rising economic power.

This work asks the question: does any social solidarity exist among Americans? A group of sociologists, political theorists, and social historians explore ideological differences, theoretical disputes, social processes and institutional change.