China Maritime Studies No. 4. Addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil Military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Why are these important? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. 1) First, because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its pri- mary function is domestic politics-that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been em- ployed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA's ground force, which is manpower- intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics-such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force)-have been more privileged in China's military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. 2) Second, China's civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. 3) Finally, the PLAN (PLA Navy) was previously marginalized within the PLA, partly because the lat- ter was largely preoccupied with domestic issues and politics, where the PLAN is not especially useful. By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more impor- tant in China's military policy. Students participating in Chinese studies classroom assignments may be interested in this volume for research. This work may also be of interest to military and political science students as well as military historians, military strategists, and political science scholars.

This study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. First, because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its primary function is domestic politics -- that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been employed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA's ground force, which is manpower-intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics -- such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force) -- have been more privileged in China's military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. Second, China's civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. Finally, the PLAN was previously marginalized within the PLA ... By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more important in China's military policy.

This book demonstrates that civil-military relations have evolved beyond symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in post-Deng Xiaoping China. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a Leninist party-army, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA is symbiotic and institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor are absent between the two. This symbiosis suggests that the primary role of the PLA is in China’s domestic politics; it is to participate in intra-CCP leadership power struggle and in defending the CCP regime against popular rebellions from within Chinese society. By analyzing major changes in the functions of the PLA political commissar system, the extent of the PLA involvement in the power struggle of the CCP leadership, and the circulation of elites across civil-military institutional boundaries, this book offers a new theoretical explanation of civil-military relations in China. It also discusses the implications of the findings for China’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

This work provides an in-depth and up-to-date examination of civil-military relations in China. It reflects the significant changes taking place in Chinese society and their impact on the civil-military dynamic, with particular attention to how the military will fit in with the new class of entrepreneurs. Rather than focusing exclusively on elite Party-Army relations, the book examines civil-military relations from various vantage points: at "the center" and in the provinces; between civilian leaders and military leaders; from a strictly military perspective and from a civilian perspective; and from the angle of specific issue areas. Chapters explore issues, such as the impact of AIDS, the defense budget, the emerging dynamic between the military and China's new leadership, resettling demobilized troops back into civilian life, and the role of the militia, reserve units, and other civilian groups. The contributors are highly respected specialists in China studies, including political scientists, historians, PLA specialists, and sociologists. They present a vibrant portrait of the new civil-military dynamic in the PRC within the complex social changes that China is exploring today.

This thesis applies Multiah Alagappa's framework for analyzing civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Deng era, when several key developments have fundamentally altered the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These developments include the absence of a powerful paramount leader, the generational shifts in the civilian and military leaderships, the increasing professionalization of the PLA, the decline of communism as a legitimating ideology, the sustained progress of economic development, the emergence of a robust civil society, and the increasing legitimacy of China's political system. Moreover, this thesis undertakes an extensive review of the various explanations and theories advanced in the literature of civil-military relations, asserting that Alagappa's analytical framework offers the most comprehensive tool for analyzing civil-military relations to date. Using Alagappa's analytical framework, this thesis argues that the current trend in civil-military relations in China has brought increasing civilian supremacy, as the political power and influence of the PLA have diminished over time due to the decreasing significance of coercion in governance, the strengthening of non-coercive state institutions, China's sustained high level of economic development, and the increasing legitimacy of China's political system.

Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state of China’s armed forces. The authors found that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving to correct them. Although it is only natural to focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments—is no less important.