Acknowledging that though the disciplines are supposed to be cumulative, there is little in the way of accumulated, general theory, this work opens a dialogue about the appropriate means and ends of social research based in analysis of fundamental issues. This book examines two root issues in the methodology of explanatory social research--the meaning of the idea of causation in social science and the question of the physiological mechanism that generates intentional behavior. Conclusions on these as well as on several derived problems emerge through the analysis. Among the latter, the analysis shows that neither universal nor probabilistic laws governing human behavior are possible, even within the positivist or empiricist traditions in which laws are a central feature. Instead, the analysis reveals a more modest view of what an explanatory social theory can be and do. In this view, the kind of theory that can be produced is basically the same in form and content across quantitative and qualitative research approaches, and similarly across different disciplines. The two streams of analysis are combined with resulting implications for large-sample, small-sample, and case study research design as well as for laws and theory. Written for the practicing empirical researcher in political science and organization theory, whether quantitative or qualitative, the major issuesand findings are meant to hold identically, however, for history, sociology, and other social science disciplines. Lawrence B. Mohr is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Michigan.

This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.

Using a mixed-method approach, Unintended Consequences of Human Actions documents a wide range of unintended and unanticipated consequences of human actions. The major message is the urgent need to review a range of possible outcomes of human actions. During these fragile times 'looking down the road' has become imperative.

Which events in the life of a person count as her actions---as things she does, intentionally, even? The received view in action theory claims that an intentional action is one that is caused (in the right way) by the right mental items. I here argue that the causal component is critical for a sufficiently robust conception of human action (contrary to what "noncausalists" have claimed). Nevertheless, the causal theory is in need of amendment and I offer suggestions for how to go about making the proper corrections. Finally, it has been argued that cases involving intentional failures to act pose a problem for the causal theory of action and I here defend the causal view from such an objection, while also offering recommendations for how a causal theorist ought to think about omissions.

Leading figures working in the philosophy of action debate foundational issues relating to the causal theory of action. The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout

Why do human beings move? In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior. Biological science investigates what makes our bodies move in the way they do. Psychology is interested in why persons—agents with reasons—move in the way they do. Dretske attempts to reconcile these different points of view by showing how reasons operate in a world of causes. He reveals in detail how the character of our inner states—what we believe, desire, and intend—determines what we do.