The ideas of C. D. Broad have affected the work of moral philosophers throughout the twentieth century to the present day. First published in 1971, this edited volume contains Broad’s best essays on the philosophical problems of Ethics, mostly written and published between 1914 and 1964. Among the essays are Broad’s important critiques of G. E. Moore’s ethical theory, his lecture entitled ‘Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism’, and other pieces discussing topics as broad as Conscience, Egoism and Free Will. This reissue serves as an important companion to Broad’s other works, a number of which have also been reissued within the Routledge Library Editions series, and will be invaluable to students interested in Broad’s theories and twentieth-century philosophical thought.

The ideas of C. D. Broad have affected the work of moral philosophers throughout the twentieth century to the present day. First published in 1971, this edited volume contains Broad’s best essays on the philosophical problems of Ethics, mostly written and published between 1914 and 1964. Among the essays are Broad’s important critiques of G. E. Moore’s ethical theory, his lecture entitled ‘Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism’, and other pieces discussing topics as broad as Conscience, Egoism and Free Will. This reissue serves as an important companion to Broad’s other works, a number of which have also been reissued within the Routledge Library Editions series, and will be invaluable to students interested in Broad’s theories and twentieth-century philosophical thought.

First published in 1971, the five essays in this book were written by young philosophers at Cambridge at that time. They focus on two major questions of ethical theory: ‘What is it to judge morally?’ and ‘What makes a reason a moral reason?’. The book explores the relation of moral judgements to attitudes, emotions and beliefs as well as the notions of expression, agency, and moral responsibility.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical achievement lies in the development of a new philosophical method rather than in the elaboration of a particular philosophical system. Dr Paul Johnston applies this innovative method to the central problems of moral philosophy: whether there can be ‘truth’ in ethics, or what the meaning of objectivity might mean in the context of moral deliberation. Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, first published in 1989, represents the first serious and rigorous attempt to apply Wittgenstein’s method to ethics. The conclusions arrived at differ radically from those dominating contemporary ethical discussion, revealing an immense discrepancy between the ethical concepts employed in everyday moral decision-making and the way in which these are discussed by philosophers. Dr Johnston examines ways of eliminating this discrepancy in order to gain a clearer picture of the proper nature of moral claims, and at the same time provides new insights into Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy.

Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the ‘is-ought’ issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.