Renowned for its accuracy, brevity, and readability, this book has long been the gold standard of concise histories of the Napoleonic Wars. Now in an updated and revised edition, it is unique in its portrayal of one of the world's great generals as a scrambler who never had a plan, strategic or tactical, that did not break down or change of necessity in the field. Distinguished historian Owen Connelly argues that Napoleon was the master of the broken play, so confident of his ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy that he repeatedly plunged his armies into uncertain, seemingly desperate situations, only to emerge victorious as he "blundered" to glory. Beginning with a sketch of Napoleon's early life, the book progresses to his command of artillery at Toulon and the "whiff of grapeshot" in Paris that netted him control of the Army of Italy, where his incredible performance catapulted him to fame. The author vividly traces Napoleon's campaigns as a general of the French Revolution and emperor of the French, knowledgeably analyzing each battle's successes and failures. The author depicts Napoleon's "art of war" as a system of engaging the enemy, waiting for him to make a mistake, improvising a plan on the spot-and winning. Far from detracting from Bonaparte's reputation, his blunders rather made him a great general, a "natural" who depended on his intuition and ability to read battlefields and his enemy to win. Exploring this neglected aspect of Napoleon's battlefield genius, Connelly at the same time offers stirring and complete accounts of all the Napoleonic campaigns.

The two-volume Chief of Staff examines the history, development, and role of the military duty position of the chief of staff. Many books have studied history's great commanders and the art of command. None have focused exclusively on the chief of staff -—that key staff officer responsible for translating the ideas of the commander into practical plans that common soldiers can execute successfully on the battlefield. In some cases, it is almost impossible to think of certain great commanders without also thinking of their chief of staff. Napoleon's chief of staff Berthier and Eisenhower's chief of staff Bedell Smith are two examples that are profiled in this work. Zabecki and his collaborators examine the history, development, and role of the chief of staff primarily through profiles of the most important practitioners of the art. These books are published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.

"History has tended to measure war's winners and losers in terms of its major engagements, battles in which the result was so clear-cut that they could be considered "decisive." Cannae, Konigsberg, Austerlitz, Midway, Agincourt-all resonate in the literature of war and in our imaginations as tide-turning. But these legendary battles may or may not have determined the final outcome of the wars in which they were fought. Nor has the "genius" of the so-called Great Captains--from Alexander the Great to Frederick the Great and Napoleon--played a major role. Wars are decided in other ways. Cathal J. Nolan's The Allure of Battle systematically and engrossingly examines the great battles, tracing what he calls "short-war thinking," the hope that victory might be swift and wars brief. As he proves persuasively, however, such has almost never been the case. Even the major engagements have mainly contributed to victory or defeat by accelerating the erosion of the other side's defences. Massive conflicts, the so-called "people's wars," beginning with Napoleon and continuing until 1945, have consisted of and been determined by prolonged stalemate and attrition, industrial wars in which the determining factor has been not military but mataeriel. Nolan's masterful book places battles squarely and mercilessly within the context of the wider conflict in which they took place. In the process it help corrects a distorted view of battle's role in war, replacing popular images of the "battles of annihilation" with somber appreciation of the commitments and human sacrifices made throughout centuries of war particularly among the Great Powers. Accessible, provocative, exhaustive, and illuminating, The Allure of Battle will spark fresh debate about the history and conduct of warfare."--Provided by publisher.

Why do military commanders, most of them usually quite capable, fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer -- one a historian, the other an educational psychologist -- study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler's invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war. The other battles and commanders studied here are Napoleon in Russia, George B. McClellan's Peninsular Campaign, Robert E. Lee and Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, John Bell Hood at the Battle of Franklin, Douglas Haig and the British command during World War I, "Bomber" Harris and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, and Stalingrad.

From the Carolina Swamp Fox to the Afghan Mujahideen, this book analyzes 40 guerrilla struggles across five continents, profiles important figures, and gives extensive bibliographical information. With an emphasis on causes and effects, Part I surveys and analyzes all major guerrilla struggles and many less well known wars from the American Revolution to 20th-century post-colonial conflicts. Drawing a distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the author focuses on guerrilla activity. He seeks to answer such questions as the genesis and context of an insurgency, its resemblance to other guerrilla conflicts, what factors contributed to victory or defeat, which factors are unique to a conflict, and what factors are common to many conflicts. Part II profiles individuals who are important to the subject, including guerrilla chieftains, military commanders, government officials, party leaders, theorists, and instructors who exerted notable influence. Part III surveys the major English-language literature on guerrilla warfare, providing a a wide-ranging, representative, and intensive collection of works.

This carefully researched book provides an operational level analysis of European warfare from 1792 to 1815 that includes the tactics, operations, and strategy of major conflicts of the time. 2015 marks the 200th anniversary of the famous Waterloo campaign, sparking a renewed interest in Napoleon's prowess as a military leader and acumen as a strategist. This in-depth analysis scrutinizes the complex campaigns and strategies of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, looking at how military genius—referred to in the book as "operational art"—shaded the panorama of 18th-century warfare. Drawing upon familiar battles as well as lesser-known campaigns, this sweeping reference uses 20th-century military theory to explain 19th-century events. Author John T. Kuehn discusses joint warfare and strategy found in the military movements of Marshal Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland in 1799; the early and later campaigns of Napoleon and Nelson; and the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. The work also includes an entire chapter on theory and history of operational art spanning a variety of perspectives—from theorist Carl von Clausewitz to American air force pilot John Boyd. This book is a must-have for any military history collection.

This revisionist history offers a fresh analysis of Napoleon and the French army as they defended their empire against the massive Coalition invasion of 1814. French defeat in 1814 is too often shrugged off as the result of obvious and understandable factors. Napoleon Against Great Odds: The Emperor and the Defenders of France, 1814 challenges the widely accepted notion that war-weariness and internal political opposition to Napoleon were the decisive and direct causes of French defeat. At least as important, it argues, were material shortages, diplomatic missteps, and even faulty strategic planning on Napoleon's part. The book not only traces the narrative of Napoleon's 1814 Campaign in France, but explores the formation of the French army tasked with defending France against the Coalition invasion. Diplomatic, political, and social factors are taken into account and the issue of war-weariness is analyzed carefully and critically. Each branch and arm of the French forces is examined, as are military mobilization under difficult circumstances and partisan and guerilla warfare. Designed to encourage fresh debate about the 1814 campaign, the book offers thought-provoking reading for scholars and general readers alike.