In recent years, new disease threats such as SARS, avian flu, mad cow disease, and drug-resistant strains of malaria and tuberculosis have garnered media attention and galvanized political response. Proposals for new approaches to "securing health" against these threats have come not only from public health and medicine but also from such fields as emergency management, national security, and global humanitarianism. This volume provides a map of this complex and rapidly transforming terrain. The editors focus on how experts, public officials, and health practitioners work to define what it means to "secure health" through concrete practices such as global humanitarian logistics, pandemic preparedness measures, vaccination campaigns, and attempts to regulate potentially dangerous new biotechnologies. As the contributions show, despite impressive activity in these areas, the field of "biosecurity interventions" remains unstable. Many basic questions are only beginning to be addressed: Who decides what counts as a biosecurity problem? Who is responsible for taking action, and how is the efficacy of a given intervention to be evaluated? It is crucial to address such questions today, when responses to new problems of health and security are still taking shape. In this context, this volume offers a form of critical and reflexive knowledge that examines how technical efforts to increase biosecurity relate to the political and ethical challenges of living with risk.

The product of collaboration between anthropologists, geographers, sociologists, and even a chemist, this volume delves into the design and implementation of 'global' bio-security interventions.

Globally, the way the animal production industry copes with infectious diseases is changing. The (excessive) use of antimicrobials is under debate and it is becoming standard practice to implement thorough biosecurity plans on farms to prevent the entry and spread of pathogenic micro-organisms. Not only in farm animal production, but also in facilities where companion animals are kept, including in veterinary practices and clinics, awareness of the beneficial implications of a good biosecurity plan has raised. The book Biosecurity in Animal Production and Veterinary Medicine is the first compilation of both fundamental aspects of biosecurity practices, and specific and practical information on the application of the biosecurity measures in different animal production and animal housing settings.

In Bioinsecurities Neel Ahuja argues that U.S. imperial expansion has been shaped by the attempts of health and military officials to control the interactions of humans, animals, viruses, and bacteria at the borders of U.S. influence, a phenomenon called the government of species. The book explores efforts to control the spread of Hansen's disease, venereal disease, polio, smallpox, and HIV through interventions linking the continental United States to Hawai'i, Panamá, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Congo, Iraq, and India in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Ahuja argues that racial fears of contagion helped to produce public optimism concerning state uses of pharmaceuticals, medical experimentation, military intervention, and incarceration to regulate the immune capacities of the body. In the process, the security state made the biological structures of human and animal populations into sites of struggle in the politics of empire, unleashing new patient activisms and forms of resistance to medical and military authority across the increasingly global sphere of U.S. influence.

"The renewed threat of biological weapons highlights the importance of crafting policy responses informed by the rule of law. This book explores patterns in recent governance initiatives and advocates building a "global biosecurity concert" as a way to address the threats presented by biological weapons and infectious diseases in the early 21st century."--BOOK JACKET.

Biosecurity: A Systems Perspective provides an overview of biosecurity as a system of related components, actors, and risks. This book—directed to the biosecurity practitioner, generalist scientist, and student—introduces overall features of the biosecurity system while walking the reader through the most up-to-date research on each step of the continuum (i.e. pre-border, border, and post-border activities). This book, which explicitly incorporates economic and social dimensions as well as varied decision-making contexts, paves the way for a more systemic approach to biosecurity risk management. The work spans statistics, ecology, mathematics, economics, veterinary science, human medicine, and sociology, involving collaborators across government, academia, and the private sector. This book uses a broad definition of biosecurity, rather than solely focusing on plant health, animal health, security, or one step of the biosecurity system (e.g. surveillance). As such, this book is a one-stop shop for readers interested in all aspects of biosecurity. The content and language are accessible to a wide range of audiences, including generalist scientists, biosecurity practitioners, and graduate students. More complex content is introduced in standalone boxes or chapters. The book follows a clear, simple structure within and among chapters (i.e. following the structure of the biosecurity system), making it a preferred option for graduate students. This book introduces novel cross-cutting themes, such as the importance of economic efficiency and institutional and social factors, going beyond the traditional science-based approach to biosecurity. Written in partnership with government agency practitioners, this book uses on-the-ground case studies to demonstrate how biosecurity principles are applied in practice. The book addresses challenges common to regulators in general, namely efficient regulation in uncertain and rapidly changing environments with multiple stakeholders who have—at times—conflicting priorities.

By achieving a delicate balance between systems and practices, proper laboratory biosecurity reduces the risk of legitimate bioscience facilities becoming sources of pathogens and toxins for malicious use. Effective design and implementation of laboratory biosecurity depends on cooperation among individuals from diverse communities, including scien