Applies Dogen Kigen's religious philosophy and the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro to the philosophical problem of personal identity, probing the applicability of the concept of non-self to the philosophical problems of selfhood, otherness, and temporality which culminate in the conundrum of personal identity.

The authors challenge theories that put the body at the centre of identity, going 'beyond the body' to highlight the persistence of self-identity even when the body itself has been disposed of or is missing.

There can be few people in the early twenty-first century who have not, at some time, asked the question, "Who am I?" or set out to "find themselves." With creative insight and common sense, Dick Keyes offers a novel solution to the modern problem of identity that is found in the very creation of humanity itself. As human beings, we find our worth, value and meaning not in possessions, approval in others'eyes, or in the integration of our emotional life. We truly find ourselves only when we look "beyond identity" to a relationship with the God who made us. Dick Keyes and his wife Mardi, have worked with L'Abri Fellowship for over forty years in Switzerland, England and now in Massachusetts. He is a graduate of Harvard University and Westminster Theological Seminary. He is also the author of: Heroism, Chameleon Christianity, Seeing Through Cynicism

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke’s use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.

A comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body, this title places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, and discusses the major related theories.