The sociology of science is dominated today by relativists who boldly argue that the content of science is not influenced by evidence from the empirical world but is instead socially constructed in the laboratory. Making Science is the first serious critique by a sociologist of the social constructivist position. Stephen Cole begins by making a distinction between two kinds of knowledge: the core, which consists of those contributions that have passed the test of evaluation and are universally accepted as true and important, and the research frontier, which is composed of all work in progress that is still under evaluation. Of the thousands of scientific contributions made each year, only a handful end up in the core. What distinguishes those that are successful? Agreeing with the constructivists, Cole argues that there exists no set of rules that enables scientists to certify the validity of frontier knowledge. This knowledge is "underdetermined" by the evidence, and therefore social factors--such as professional characteristics and intellectual authority--can and do play a crucial role in its evaluation. But Cole parts company with the constructivists when he asserts that it is impossible to understand which frontier knowledge wins a place in the core without first considering the cognitive characteristics of the contributions. He concludes that although the focus of scientific research, the rate of advance, and indeed the everyday making of science are influenced by social variables and processes, the content of the core of science is constrained by nature. In Making Science, Cole shows how social variables and cognitive variables interact in the evaluation of frontier knowledge.

An attack on the idea that nature and society are impossible to distinguish from each other In a world careening towards climate chaos, nature is dead. It can no longer be separated from society. Everything is a blur of hybrids, where humans possess no exceptional agency to set them apart from dead matter. But is it really so? In this blistering polemic and theoretical manifesto, Andreas Malm develops a counterargument: in a warming world, nature comes roaring back, and it is more important than ever to distinguish between the natural and the social. Only with a unique agency attributed to humans can resistance become conceivable.

First published in 1998.This is Volume XIV of eighteen in the Sociology of Behaviour and Psychology series. This text is concerned with sociological inquiry into society and nature. Written in 1946, it investigates the idea that society and nature, if conceived of as two different systems of elements, are the results of two different methods of thinking and are only as such two different objects. The same elements, connected with each other according to the principle of causality, constitute nature; connected with each other according to another, namely, a normative, principle, they constitute society

First Published in 1996. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Ferkiss (emeritus, government, Georgetown U.) delves thoughtfully into how various civilizations and cultures, including Western civilization, have historically looked at humanity, nature, and technology. He then looks at the conflicting attitudes of contemporary thinkers, seeking a balance, but maintaining a bias toward reverence for nature and an unwillingness to allow technology and its owners to set all the terms. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

As a prominent figure in analytic philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries, Nenad Miščević has enriched, enhanced, and expanded many areas of the field. This volume, dedicated to him for his 65th birthday, follows the virtues he so much respects – conceptual analysis, rigorous use of logics, and clear definitions – and applies them to a very hot topic in philosophy, thought experiments. Present throughout the history of philosophy, thought experiments have become indispensable for the discipline and for analytic philosophy in particular. But questions can be asked, as to what exactly is a thought experiment, what it consists of, and, most importantly, if it is even useful for philosophy. Next to these conceptual questions, this collection tackles thought experiments that have tradition, some of them very long, like The Ring of Gyges, The Social Contract, and Descartes’ Evil Demon. Others, like Twin Earth, Gettier cases and Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiments, have prompted at least half-a-century-long trails. One cannot understand contemporary analytic philosophy without understanding these trails and traditions. Nenad’s closest friends and colleagues, from all over Europe, share their thoughts on this topic in this book, followed diligently by Nenad’s comments on their work.