Human error is cited over and over as a cause of incidents and accidents. The result is a widespread perception of a 'human error problem', and solutions are thought to lie in changing the people or their role in the system. For example, we should reduce the human role with more automation, or regiment human behavior by stricter monitoring, rules or procedures. But in practice, things have proved not to be this simple. The label 'human error' is prejudicial and hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or malfunctions. This book takes you behind the human error label. Divided into five parts, it begins by summarising the most significant research results. Part 2 explores how systems thinking has radically changed our understanding of how accidents occur. Part 3 explains the role of cognitive system factors - bringing knowledge to bear, changing mindset as situations and priorities change, and managing goal conflicts - in operating safely at the sharp end of systems. Part 4 studies how the clumsy use of computer technology can increase the potential for erroneous actions and assessments in many different fields of practice. And Part 5 tells how the hindsight bias always enters into attributions of error, so that what we label human error actually is the result of a social and psychological judgment process by stakeholders in the system in question to focus on only a facet of a set of interacting contributors. If you think you have a human error problem, recognize that the label itself is no explanation and no guide to countermeasures. The potential for constructive change, for progress on safety, lies behind the human error label.

This title was first published in 2002: This field guide assesses two views of human error - the old view, in which human error becomes the cause of an incident or accident, or the new view, in which human error is merely a symptom of deeper trouble within the system. The two parts of this guide concentrate on each view, leading towards an appreciation of the new view, in which human error is the starting point of an investigation, rather than its conclusion. The second part of this guide focuses on the circumstances which unfold around people, which causes their assessments and actions to change accordingly. It shows how to "reverse engineer" human error, which, like any other componant, needs to be put back together in a mishap investigation.

This 1991 book is a major theoretical integration of several previously isolated literatures looking at human error in major accidents.

Accidents happen because of the reduction in adaptable capabilities or because inadaptability takes over. Inadaptability is the failure to adapt according to changed circumstances, settings or time. The occurrence of human errors in manual assembly lines can be affected by factors, such as workplace condition, work environment, equipment and demographics factors. Another topic explored in this book is forensic science which is concerned with the application of scientific knowledge to legal problem resolution. It is a vital tool in any legal proceeding, because it helps the judge and the jury to understand scientific truth. Also, human error in medicine is a major threat to patient safety. Therefore, it is vital to reveal factors that cause performance deficits in medical work environments. On the basis of the human error sources identified, human factors training programs can be designed as one possible approach to preventing accidents and increasing safety. Human error has been cited as a common cause in disasters and accidents in diverse high-risk industries and in healthcare. This book focuses on organizational, social and individual causes for the development of conditions behind human errors.

Aircraft and the three-dimensional environment in which they operate are not user-friendly for human beings. As a result, developing and maintaining the proficiencies necessary to safely and efficiently fly an airplane or helicopter are difficult, time-consuming, and costly. Flight training has barely progressed beyond the basics, perhaps because of a typical pilot's limited time and money. Training remains a sort of crash course in not crashing, with almost exclusive concentration on physically coordinating, maneuvering, and manually handling-not manhandling-an aircraft.

WHAT COMMON FACTORS CONNECT THE DEATH OF MARY SANDERS DURING A SIMPLE SURGICAL INTERVENTION, CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER, AND THE COSTA CONCORDIA SHIPWRECK? WAS IT A FATAL MINDSET, DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT, AN ACT OF DESTINY OR...' IT IS THE HUMAN ERROR THE THREAD THAT BINDS THESE (AND MANY OTHER) TRAGIC EVENTS. HOW TO BEST PREVENT, MANAGE AND MITIGATE ITS EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES IS THE SUBJECT OF STUDY BY CPT. FERDINANDO RESTINA.