Bayonets before Bullets is the first comprehensive institutional and operational history of the Imperial Russian Army during the crucial period of its modernization, 1861-1914. Bruce W. Menning surveys the development of organization, doctrine, and strategy from the aftermath of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War through the wars against Turkey in 1877-1878 and Japan in 1904-1905, to the eve of World War I. Describing how the Russian army organized, trained, and armed itself to fight during a critical era of change, Menning weaves analysis of reforms in technology and military art with lively accounts of combat operations and portraits of the personalities involved. Enhanced by superb battlefield maps, operational diagrams, and rare photographs of the leading Russian military commanders, Bayonets before Bullets provides a fascinating account of how the Imperial Russian Army struggled to modernize in a Darwinian world that dealt harshly with those who failed to adapt to changes in technology and military art.

This book examines the rise and the fall of the Russian Empire through the lens of its military history. While much of the literature on this history tends to focus on epochs, The Russian Military and the Creation of Empire uses a variety of archival sources to capture this aspect of modern Russia from Peter the Great right up to the present day. John W. Steinberg analyzes the social dynamic between Russian society and its military over time. Through a focus on civil-military relations, he demonstrates that both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes were built on, and ultimately dependent upon, the support of the military. Case studies of significant battles are also used throughout the volume to reveal insights into the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Russian military since 1689. The Russian Military and the Creation of Empire is a vital study for all students of modern Russia and the history of modern warfare.

Bullets, Bombs, and Bayonets draws attention to a significant part of Canadian military history, a period in which almost an entire generation of young men never returned from the battlefields of Europe. In 2017 Canada commemorates the 100th year of the Battle of Vimy Ridge. The triumphant conquering of Vimy by the Canadian Corps in April 1917, was considered a defining moment in Canada’s rise to nationhood. Equally significant but much less publicized was the Canadian victory at Passchendaele in the fall of 1917. It was there that more than 4,000 Canadian soldiers died, and almost 12,000 wounded. The Battle of Passchendaele will be forever remembered as a colossal slaughter in the mud of Flanders fields. Bullets, Bombs, and Bayonets acknowledges those members of the 43rd Battalion who fought and died in the Ypres Salient, in the name of freedom.

Dr. Richard Gatling invented the world’s first practical machine gun in 1862. Between that weapon and subsequent improved designs, the world’s armies had roughly 50 years to adopt the machine gun and perfect its employment before it helped wreak the carnage of World War I. However, for some reason or combination of reasons, none of the armies of the day saw fit to do so. This thesis explores the potential explanations behind this phenomenon by using the Russo-Japanese War as a case study. The Russo-Japanese War should have demonstrated to the world how the machine gun fundamentally altered the conduct of land warfare, especially since the major world powers all sent military observers to report on the war’s events. This thesis will show, however, that because of a complex combination of the prevalent military tactical culture, bureaucratic pragmatism and logistical concerns, the five major protagonist armies of World War I generally failed to apply the lessons they learned about machine-gun employment from the Russo-Japanese War and as a result were completely surprised by the weapon’s impact on the battlefield ten years later.

This is the first truly definitive history of the First World War, the war that has done most to shape the twentieth century. The first generation of its historians had access to only a limited range of sources, and their focus was primarily on military events. More recent approaches have embraced cultural, diplomatic, economic, and social history. In Hew Strachan's authoritative and readable history these fresh perspectives are incorporated with the military and strategic narrative. The result is an account that breaks the bounds of national preoccupations to become both global and comparative. To Arms, the first of three volumes in this magisterial study, examines not only the causes of the war and its opening clashes on land and sea, but also the ideas that underpinned it, and the motivations of the people who supported it. It provides full and pioneering accounts of the war's finances, of the war in Africa, and of the Central Powers' bid to widen the war outside Europe.

In October 1917, an invasion force of some 25,000 German soldiers, accompanied by a flotilla of 10 dreadnoughts, 350 other vessels, a half-dozen zeppelins, and 80 aircraft, attacked the Baltic islands of Dago, Osel, and Moon at the head of the Gulf of Riga. It proved to be the most successful amphibious operation of World War I. The three islands fell, the Gulf was opened to German warships and was now a threat to Russian naval bases in the Gulf of Finland, and 20,000 Russians were captured. The invasion proved to be the last major operation in the East. Although the invasion had achieved its objectives and placed the Germans in an excellent position for the resumption of warfare in the spring, within three weeks of the operation, the Bolsheviks took power in Russia (November 7, 1917) and Albion faded into obscurity as the war in the East came to a slow end.

At its height, the Russian empire covered eleven time zones and stretched from Scandinavia to the Pacific Ocean. Arguing against the traditional historical view that Russia, surrounded and threatened by enemies, was always on the defensive, John P. LeDonne contends that Russia developed a long-term strategy not in response to immediate threats but in line with its own expansionist urges to control the Eurasian Heartland. LeDonne narrates how the government from Moscow and Petersburg expanded the empire by deploying its army as well as by extending its patronage to frontier societies in return for their serving the interests of the empire. He considers three theaters on which the Russians expanded: the Western (Baltic, Germany, Poland); the Southern (Ottoman and Persian Empires); and the Eastern (China, Siberia, Central Asia). In his analysis of military power, he weighs the role of geography and locale, as well as economic issues, in the evolution of a larger imperial strategy. Rather than viewing Russia as peripheral to European Great Power politics, LeDonne makes a powerful case for Russia as an expansionist, militaristic, and authoritarian regime that challenged the great states and empires of its time.