Relevant to, and drawing from, a range of disciplines, the chapters in this collection show the diversity, and applicability, of research in Bayesian argumentation. Together, they form a challenge to philosophers versed in both the use and criticism of Bayesian models who have largely overlooked their potential in argumentation. Selected from contributions to a multidisciplinary workshop on the topic held in Sweden in 2010, the authors count linguists and social psychologists among their number, in addition to philosophers. They analyze material that includes real-life court cases, experimental research results, and the insights gained from computer models. The volume provides, for the first time, a formal measure of subjective argument strength and argument force, robust enough to allow advocates of opposing sides of an argument to agree on the relative strengths of their supporting reasoning. With papers from leading figures such as Michael Oaksford and Ulrike Hahn, the book comprises recent research conducted at the frontiers of Bayesian argumentation and provides a multitude of examples in which these formal tools can be applied to informal argument. It signals new and impending developments in philosophy, which has seen Bayesian models deployed in formal epistemology and philosophy of science, but has yet to explore the full potential of Bayesian models as a framework in argumentation. In doing so, this revealing anthology looks destined to become a standard teaching text in years to come.​

For almost 2,500 years, the Western concept of what is to be human has been dominated by the idea that the mind is the seat of reason - humans are, almost by definition, the rational animal. In this text a more radical suggestion for explaining these puzzling aspects of human reasoning is put forward.

In this clearly reasoned defense of Bayes's Theorem -- that probability can be used to reasonably justify scientific theories -- Colin Howson and Peter Urbach examine the way in which scientists appeal to probability arguments, and demonstrate that the classical approach to statistical inference is full of flaws. Arguing the case for the Bayesian method with little more than basic algebra, the authors show that it avoids the difficulties of the classical system. The book also refutes the major criticisms leveled against Bayesian logic, especially that it is too subjective. This newly updated edition of this classic textbook is also suitable for college courses.

The contributions in this volume focus on the Bayesian interpretation of natural languages, which is widely used in areas of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computational linguistics. This is the first volume to take up topics in Bayesian Natural Language Interpretation and make proposals based on information theory, probability theory, and related fields. The methodologies offered here extend to the target semantic and pragmatic analyses of computational natural language interpretation. Bayesian approaches to natural language semantics and pragmatics are based on methods from signal processing and the causal Bayesian models pioneered by especially Pearl. In signal processing, the Bayesian method finds the most probable interpretation by finding the one that maximizes the product of the prior probability and the likelihood of the interpretation. It thus stresses the importance of a production model for interpretation as in Grice’s contributions to pragmatics or in interpretation by abduction.

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task.

The theory of argumentation is a rich, interdisciplinary area of research involving philosophy, communications studies, linguistics, psychology, and logics. Its techniques have found a wide range of applications in both theoretical and practical branches of artificial intelligence and computer science. Multi-agent systems theory has picked up argumentation-inspired approaches and specifically argumentation-theoretic results from many different areas. Researchers in argumentation and multi-agent systems are currently enjoying a unique opportunity to integrate the various understandings of argument into a coherent and core part of the functioning of autonomous computational systems. This book originates from the First International Workshop on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems, ArgMAS 2004, held in New York, NY, USA in July 2004. Besides 12 selected revised full papers taken from the workshop, 4 additional papers by key people in the area round off overall coverage of the relevant topics. The papers address the following main topics: foundations of dialogues, belief revision, persuasion and deliberation, negotiation, and strategic issues.

Argumentation is all around us. Letters to the Editor often make points of cons- tency, and “Why” is one of the most frequent questions in language, asking for r- sons behind behaviour. And argumentation is more than ‘reasoning’ in the recesses of single minds, since it crucially involves interaction. It cements the coordinated social behaviour that has allowed us, in small bands of not particularly physically impressive primates, to dominate the planet, from the mammoth hunt all the way up to organized science. This volume puts argumentation on the map in the eld of Arti cial Intelligence. This theme has been coming for a while, and some famous pioneers are chapter authors, but we can now see a broader systematic area emerging in the sum of topics and results. As a logician, I nd this intriguing, since I see AI as ‘logic continued by other means’, reminding us of broader views of what my discipline is about. Logic arose originally out of re ection on many-agent practices of disputation, in Greek Ant- uity, but also in India and China. And logicians like me would like to return to this broader agenda of rational agency and intelligent interaction. Of course, Aristotle also gave us a formal systems methodology that deeply in uenced the eld, and eventually connected up happily with mathematical proof and foundations.