With wit and intelligence, Leo Katz seeks to understand the basic rules and concepts underlying the moral, linguistic, and psychological puzzles that plague the criminal law. "Bad Acts and Guilty Minds . . . revives the mind, it challenges superficial analyses, it reminds us that underlying the vast body of statutory and case law, there is a rationale founded in basic notions of fairness and reason. . . . It will help lawyers to better serve their clients and the society that permits attorneys to hang out their shingles."—Edward N. Costikyan, New York Times Book Review

The author of Ill-Gotten Gains uses philosophy and psychology to examine how human behavior can be questioned under criminal law. Henri plans a trek through the desert. Alphonse, intending to kill Henri, puts poison into his canteen. Gaston also intends to kill Henri but has no idea what Alphonse has been up to. He puncture’s Henri’s canteen, and Henri dies of thirst. Who has caused Henri’s death? Was it Alphonse? Gaston? Or neither? Strange conundrums like this one have fascinated lawyers and no lawyers for centuries, raising problems of causation, intention, negligence, necessity, duress, complicity, and attempt. With wit and intelligence, Leo Katz seeks to understand the basic rules and concepts underlying these moral, linguistic, and psychological puzzles that plague the criminal law. Drawing on insights from analytical philosophy and psychology, he brings order into the seemingly endless multiplicity of these puzzles: many of them turn out to be variations of a few basic philosophical problems, making their appearance in different guises. To test his arguments, Katz moves far beyond the traditional body of exemplary criminal law cases. He brings into view the decisions of common law judges in colonial and postcolonial Africa, famous cases such as the Nuremberg trials, Aaron Burr’s treason, and ABSCAM, as well as well-known incidents in fiction. Praise for Bad Acts and Guilty Minds “Bad Acts and Guilty Minds . . . revives the mind, it challenges superficial analyses, it reminds us that underlying the vast body of statutory and case law, there is a rationale founded in basic notions of fairness and reason. . . . It will help lawyers to better serve their clients and the society that permits attorneys to hang out their shingles.” —Edward N. Costikyan, New York Times Book Review “With its novel combination of theoretical and interdisciplinary learning, its refreshingly new approach to old problems, and the easy accessibility made possible by the lightness of its style, Katz’s book should become a classic in the field for years to come. I would recommend it to beginning law students and lay persons interested in an introduction to the field, as well as to criminal law academics interested in furthering their already well-developed understanding of criminal law theory.” —Michael S. Moore, author of Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship

"You can't be convicted of a crime without a guilty act and a guilty mind." A lawyer might dress the same idea up in Latin: "You can't be convicted of a crime without actus reus and mens rea." Things like that are often said, but what do people mean when they say them? Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds proposes an understanding of mens rea and actus reus as limits on the authority of a state, and in particular the authority of a democratic state, to ascribe guilt through positive law to those accused of crime. Actus reus and mens rea are necessary conditions, among others, for the legitimacy, as distinct from the justice, of state punishment. The actus reus requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority, on the one hand, to ascribe guilt to those who didn't realize they were committing a crime, provided they lacked the capacity to realize they were committing a crime; and on the other, to ascribe guilt to those who realized they were committing a crime, but who lacked the capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. The mens rea requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority, on the one hand, to ascribe guilt to those who didn't realize they were committing a crime, provided their ignorance manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law and its ends, and on the other, to ascribe guilt to those who realized they were committing a crime, but whose failure to conform to the law nonetheless manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law and its ends"--

This is a comprehensive, introductory criminal law textbook that expands upon traditional concepts and cases by coverage of the most contemporary topics and issues. Contemporary material, including terrorism, computer crimes, and hate crimes, serves to illuminate the ever-evolving relationship between criminal law, society and the criminal justice system's role in balancing competing interests. The case method is used throughout the book as an effective and creative learning tool.Features include:" vignettes, core concepts, 'Cases and Concepts', 'You Decides, excerpts from state statutes, 'legal equations' and Crime in the News boxes" fully developed end-of-chapter pedagogy includes review questions, legal terminology and 'Criminal Law on the Web' resources" instructor resources (including PowerPoint slides, a computerized testbank and classroom activities) and a Student Study Site accompany this text

When someone commits a crime, what are the limits on a state's authority to define them as worthy of blame, and thus liable to punishment? This book answers that question, building on two ideas familiar to criminal lawyers: actus reus and mens rea, usually translated as "guilty act" and "guilty mind." In Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds, Stephen P. Garvey proposes an understanding of actus reus and mens rea as limits on the authority of a state, and in particular the authority of a democratic state, to ascribe guilt to those accused of crime. Garvey argues that actus reus and mens rea are necessary conditions for legitimate state punishment. Drawing on the work of political philosophers, moral philosophers, and criminal law theorists, Garvey provides clear explanations of how these concepts apply to a wide variety of cases. The book charges readers to consider practical examples and ask: whatever you believe regarding the justice of the rules, did the state act within the scope of its legitimate authority when it enacted those rules into law? Based on extensive research, this book presents a new theory in which the concepts of actus reus and mens rea mark the limits of state power rather than simply describe the elements of a crime. Making the compelling distinction between legitimacy and justice, Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds provides an important perspective on the limits of state authority.

In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused bodily movements andnothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in the drafting and the interpretation of criminal codes: 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and should require; 2) what complex descriptions of actions prohitbited by criminal codes both do and should require (inaddition to the doing of a voluntary act); and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides bothlegislators and judgees (and the lawyers who argue to both) a grounding in three of the most basic elelments of criminal liability.

Explores the role of criminal intent in constituting felony in the first two centuries of the English criminal trial jury.