Readers will come to appreciate the strength and dignity of Berneta Ringer, a true Western heroine as Doig celebrates his mother's life after finding a cache of her letters, photographs, and childhood writings. It begins with her first winter living in a tent in Montana's Crazy Mountains to the ravages of the Depression on a ranch on Falkner Creek.

The second edition of the seminal work in the field—revised, updated, and extended In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research. Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume: Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness.

Most Americans believe they possess an immaterial soul that will survive the death of the body. In sharp contrast, the current scientific consensus rejects the traditional soul, although this conclusion is rarely discussed publicly. In this book, a cognitive scientist breaks the taboo and explains why modern science leads to this controversial conclusion. In doing so, the book reveals the truly astonishing scope and power of scientific inquiry, drawing on ideas from biology, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and the physical sciences. Much more than chronicling the demise of the traditional soul, the book explores where soul beliefs come from, why they are so widespread culturally and historically, how cognitive science offers a naturalistic alternative to religious conceptions of mind, and how postulating the existence of a soul amounts to making a scientific claim. Although the new scientific view of personhood departs radically from traditional religious conceptions, the author shows that a coherent, meaningful, and sensitive appreciation of what it means to be human remains intact. He argues that we do not lose anything by letting go of our soul beliefs and that we even have something to gain. Throughout, the book takes a passionate stand for science and reason. It also offers a timely rejoinder to recent claims that science supports the existence of the soul and the afterlife.

Alternative medicine. Quantum mechanics. Gaia. Near-Death Experiences. The New Age. Fundamentalism. Feminist and Liberation Theology. These are just some of the nine most significant spiritual/scientific movements analyzed by Mark Parent in his latest book Spiritscapes.

One of the pathways by which the scientific community confirms the validity of a new scientific discovery is by repeating the research that produced it. When a scientific effort fails to independently confirm the computations or results of a previous study, some fear that it may be a symptom of a lack of rigor in science, while others argue that such an observed inconsistency can be an important precursor to new discovery. Concerns about reproducibility and replicability have been expressed in both scientific and popular media. As these concerns came to light, Congress requested that the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine conduct a study to assess the extent of issues related to reproducibility and replicability and to offer recommendations for improving rigor and transparency in scientific research. Reproducibility and Replicability in Science defines reproducibility and replicability and examines the factors that may lead to non-reproducibility and non-replicability in research. Unlike the typical expectation of reproducibility between two computations, expectations about replicability are more nuanced, and in some cases a lack of replicability can aid the process of scientific discovery. This report provides recommendations to researchers, academic institutions, journals, and funders on steps they can take to improve reproducibility and replicability in science.

A smart and funny book by a prominent Harvard psychologist, which uses groundbreaking research and (often hilarious) anecdotes to show us why we’re so lousy at predicting what will make us happy – and what we can do about it. Most of us spend our lives steering ourselves toward the best of all possible futures, only to find that tomorrow rarely turns out as we had expected. Why? As Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert explains, when people try to imagine what the future will hold, they make some basic and consistent mistakes. Just as memory plays tricks on us when we try to look backward in time, so does imagination play tricks when we try to look forward. Using cutting-edge research, much of it original, Gilbert shakes, cajoles, persuades, tricks and jokes us into accepting the fact that happiness is not really what or where we thought it was. Among the unexpected questions he poses: Why are conjoined twins no less happy than the general population? When you go out to eat, is it better to order your favourite dish every time, or to try something new? If Ingrid Bergman hadn’t gotten on the plane at the end of Casablanca, would she and Bogey have been better off? Smart, witty, accessible and laugh-out-loud funny, Stumbling on Happiness brilliantly describes all that science has to tell us about the uniquely human ability to envision the future, and how likely we are to enjoy it when we get there.