Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War examines President Eisenhower‘s mutual security program in East Asia and explains how that administration worked to contain China. This historical chronicle offers insights and perspectives regarding how to address Sino-American tensions and maintain a free and open Asia-Pacific. Eric Setzekorn argues that President Eisenhower expanded and solidified the U.S. presence in East Asia through use of military aid and military advisory efforts in sharp contrast to the use of U.S. military forces by Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. In South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Southeast Asia (particularly in Thailand and South Vietnam), the United States spent billions of dollars and significant time developing local military forces. By the end of Eisenhower‘s two terms, a force of over 1.4 million Allied soldiers in East Asia had been trained, equipped, and often paid through American military assistance. Eisenhower‘s mutual security policies were vital in building local allies, and by the end of the 1950s, East Asia was beginning a long period of growth that would make it the economic heart of the world within fifty years. American policies that created close ties and involvement in the affairs of allied nations also constrained allies, such as Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, and Syngman Rhee in South Korea, who often sought to take direct action against the PRC. The heavy role of American military advisors and experts “on the ground” in East Asia also profoundly shaped the character of these nations, all of which were emerging from war, by putting massive resources into the government administration and military forces of newly formed states. With an assertive China using its growing political and military power throughout East Asia, contemporary U.S. security challenges are similar to the situation faced in that earlier contentious era. Eisenhower‘s policies from 1953 to 1961 clearly demonstrate an awareness of the possibilities for military, economic and political growth in East Asia, and the challenges of deterring Chinese (PRC) expansion during the early Cold War. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

This title was first publishd in 2002. This work uses the concept of the "arms dynamic" to identify and assess the various factors which influenced arms acquisitions of Southeast Asian states during the second Cold War period from 1979 to 1989, providing an essential basis for understanding contemporary developments. The book provides a comprehensive and systematic explanation of the reasons for arms purchases in SE Asia during the 1980s and aims to fill a gap in the literature by fully exploring arms procurement processes in the region prior to the end of the Cold War.

During the 1990s, military spending, arms procurement and defence industrialisation have all increased rapidly in East Asia. Although these developments do not constitute an arms race, they nevertheless have important implications for suppliers of defence equipment, for arms control and for regional stability. This paper assesses trends in the defence spending of East Asian states, particularly in the light of the economic crisis, which began in mid-1997. It also focuses on three closely-related issues: the nature of the regional market for defence equipment; defence industrialisation; and the effect of trends in defence procurement and industrialisation on East Asian states' military capabilities, and on the regional military balance.

During the 1990s, military spending, arms procurement and defence industrialisation have all increased rapidly in East Asia. Although these developments do not constitute an arms race, they nevertheless have important implications for suppliers of defence equipment, for arms control and for regional stability. This paper assesses trends in the defence spending of East Asian states, particularly in the light of the economic crisis, which began in mid-1997. It also focuses on three closely-related issues: the nature of the regional market for defence equipment; defence industrialisation; and the effect of trends in defence procurement and industrialisation on East Asian states' military capabilities, and on the regional military balance.

First published in 1998, this volume examines East Asia, especially Northeast Asia, which has been a region of considerable political security of importance for several key reasons. It features several great and medium powers: China, Japan and Russia, as well as North and South Korea. Even though no arms race is yet discernible among these states (with the partial exception of the two Koreas), it is conceivable that one might commence. If it did, the level of militarization could become quite alarming, if only because of the tremendous and rapidly growing economic potential of the regional states. Even though relations among regional sates (except the two Koreas) are currently peaceful, the region features several unresolved issues (e.g. concerning territory) and a historical legacy of enmity between several states. To prevent such conflicts of interest from erupting into armed conflict is of the utmost importance. A stabilizing factor is that the military potentials in the region are still predominantly defensively oriented, i.e. most states lack the requisite power projection or invasion capabilities to inflict serious harm on each other. However, this might change in the not-so-distant future. Hence the importance of confidence-building measures; of an institutionalization of regional relations; and of a strengthening of commitments to defensive military strategies and postures.

In the prevailing climate of uncertainty and apprehension about Southeast Asia's security outlook in the post-Cold War era, this study looks at the question of whether there is an impending arms race in the region. It examines the factors behind the recent trends towards increased defence spending and force modernisation in countries in the region and what efforts should and can be undertaken to ensure that this build-up does not become a threat to regional security and stability.