How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.

History is always written by the victors. . . this is the other sie of the coin. This is the front line perspective on World War II as seen through the eyes of the losing side, the men who fought for Hitler. These are the recollections of the men of the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe and the Heer. Altogether they formed the Wehrmacht which in 1940 was the most efficient fighting force the world had ever seen. By 1942 the tide had begun to turn and the men of the once mighty Wehrmacht fought in vain at Stalingrad, El Alamein, Monte Cassino, Caen and Berlin. These are the U-boat men, the Panzer crews and the air aces. This is military history at its best and most enlightening as told from primary sources. Written by Emmy award winning author Bob Carruthers, this unique publication documents the primary accounts of many of those who fought in Hitler's army.

In uneasy partnership at the helm of the modern state stand elected party politicians and professional bureaucrats. This book is the first comprehensive comparison of these two powerful elites. In seven countries--the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands--researchers questioned 700 bureaucrats and 6OO politicians in an effort to understand how their aims, attitudes, and ambitions differ within cultural settings. One of the authors' most significant findings is that the worlds of these two elites overlap much more in the United States than in Europe. But throughout the West bureaucrats and politicians each wear special blinders and each have special virtues. In a well-ordered polity, the authors conclude, politicians articulate society's dreams and bureaucrats bring them gingerly to earth.

"This book explains who the four US military services truly are and why they make and execute policy as they do. The book focuses on American civil-military relationships, explaining why the services imperfectly satisfy their civilian bosses and why the four services think and act so differently from one another. Ultimately, the book offers three independent but mutually reinforcing contributions to the fields of security studies and American civil-military relations. First, it builds on one of the major theoretical approaches to civil-military relations--agency theory--and identifies key conditions under which agency theory best explains military service behavior. Author Jeffrey W. Donnithorne provides a "principled agent" model that finds four unique condition sets that explain civil-military dynamics with new clarity. Second, the book exposes the importance of service culture in civil-military relations and offers a rich yet concise portrait of each of the four US military services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.Third, the book offers two important case studies of civil-military policymaking. These two cases demonstrate the principled agent framework in action, while amply revealing the four services as distinctly different political actors. Finally, the book offers both conclusions and implications for today's security environment, suggesting likely pathways where the services will diverge in their approach to current defense issues. With theoretical novelty, empirical depth, and engaging military history, the book aims to reach academics, practitioners, and general readers alike"--

Committee Serial No. 55. Investigates allegations of improper and inefficient utilization of military personnel. Focuses on proposal for use of civilian personnel for many noncombat military jobs and improper use of military personnel to perform personal services for superiors.