In this book, Daniel Cohen explores the connections between arguments and metaphors, most pronounced in philosophy because philosophical discourse is both thoroughly metaphorical and replete with argumentation. Cohen covers the nature of arguments, their modes and structures, and the principles of their evaluation, and addresses the nature of metaphors, their place in language and thought, and their connections to arguments, identifying and reconciling arguments' and metaphors' respective roles in philosophy.

During the last 15 years, cognitive scientists have discovered things about the nature and importance of metaphor that are startling because of their radical implications for metaphor research and because they require us to rethink some of our most fundamental received notions of meaning, concepts, and reason. Many of the theoretical assumptions that guided earlier generations who worked on metaphor have been undermined by this new research, which has profound implications for philosophy. More specifically, the level of methodological sophistication of empirical studies of metaphor has increased markedly, making possible rigorous, detailed analyses of how metaphors actually structure conceptualization and reasoning. In addition, professionals have learned that metaphor is not merely a linguistic phenomenon but more fundamentally a conceptual and experiential process that structures the world. The articles in this special issue make significant contributions to these advances.

Although the range is wide (philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of science) in this collection of essays, there is a certain unity of treatment arising from the author's steady interest in using "linguistic analysis" to cast some new light on old problems, such as the nature of logic, causation, and induction.

Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor was first published in 1981. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. "We are," says Mark Johnson, "in the midst of metaphormania." The past few years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphor as a vehicle for exploring the relations between language and thought. While a number of recent books have dealt with metaphor from the standpoints of several disciplines, there is no collection that shows the best of the work that has been done in the field of philosophy. Mark Johnson has brought together essays that define the central issues of the discussion in this field. His introductory essay offers a critical survey of historically influential treatments of figurative language (including those of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Nietzsche) and sets forth the nature of various issues that have been of interest to philosophers. Thus, it provides a context in which to understand the motivations, influences, and significance of the collected essays. An annotated bibliography serves as a catalog of all relevant literature. Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor provides an entry point into the philosophical exploration of metaphor for students, philosophers, linguists, psychologists, artists, critics, or anyone interested in language and its relation to understanding and experience.

In this book, Earl Mac Cormac presents an original and unified cognitive theory of metaphor using philosophical arguments which draw upon evidence from psychological experiments and theories. He notes that implications of this theory for meaning and truth with specific attention to metaphor as a speech act, the iconic meaning of metaphor, and the development of a four-valued system of truth. Numerous examples of metaphor from poetry and science are presented and analyzed to support Mac Cormac's theory."A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor takes up three levels of explanation--metaphor as expressed in surface language, the semantics of metaphor, and metaphor as a cogitive process--and unifies these by interpreting metaphor as an evolutionary knowledge process in which metaphors mediate between minds and culture. Mac Cormac considers, and rejects, the radical theory that all use of language is metaphorical; however, this argument also recognizes that the "theory of metaphor may itself be metaphorical.The book first considers the computational metaphor often adopted by cognitive psychology as an example of metaphor requiring analysis. In contrast to three well-known philosophical theories of metaphor - the tension theory, the controversion theory, and the grammatical deviance theory - it develops a semantical anomaly theory of metaphor based on a quasi-mathematical hierarchy of words. In developing the theory, Mac Cormac makes much-needed connections between theories of metaphor and more orthodox analytic philosophy of meaning, including discussions of speech acts and the logic of fuzzy sets. This semantical theory of explanation is then shown to be compatible with contemporary psychologicaltheories of memory.Earl R. MacCormac is Charles A. Dana Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Davidson College. A Bradford Book.

Objects of Metaphor contains a philosophical account of the phenomenon of metaphor radically different from those currently on offer. Yet for all that it is different, the underlying rationale of the account is genuinely ecumenical. If one adopts its perspective, one should be able to see how substantially correct many other accounts are, whilst at the same time seeing why they are not in the end completely correct. The book opens with a transparent classification of types of account, and concludes with detailed discussions of three important recent contributions to the subject. The origins of the account lie in our conception of predication. Unreflectively thought of as a task accomplished by words, it is argued that predication, or something very much like it, can also be accomplished by objects. So understood, predication becomes the genuinely equal partner of reference - a function no one doubts can be as easily accomplished by objects as by words - and, liberated in this way, predication becomes one central element in the account of metaphor. The other element is the move from language to objects which, adapting an idea of Quine's, is thought of as semantic descent. Whilst Samuel Guttenplan's account allows us to see other accounts in a new light, its main importance lies in what it tells us about metaphor itself. Powerful and flexible enough to cope with the syntactic complexity typical of genuine metaphor, it offers novel conceptions of both the relationship between simile and metaphor and the notion of dead metaphor. Additionally, it allows us to see why metaphor is a robust theoretic kind, related to certain other tropes, but not to be confused with tropes generally, or with the figurative and non-literal. Metaphor has often been thought merely an ornament to language. Whilst acknowledging the truth in this thought, Guttenplan shows the fundamental importance of metaphor to language. Rather than being a specialist topic in philosophy and related disciplines, he thus suggests that the study of metaphor is central to the study of language.

The present book provides a detailed criticism of experientialist semantics, focusing both on philosophical issues connected with experientialism and on cognitive approaches to metaphor and metonymy. Particular emphasis is placed on the works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, but other cognitivists are also taken into consideration. Verena Haser proposes a new approach to the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, which contrasts with familiar cognitivist models, but also builds on some insights gained in cognitivist research. She also offers an account of metaphorical transfer which dispenses with the notion of conceptual metaphors in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson. She argues that conceptual metaphors are not a useful construct for explaining metaphorical transfer, and that the clustering of metaphorical expressions is better accounted for in terms of family resemblances between metaphorical expressions. Another major goal of this work is a reassessment of the relationship between experientialism and traditional Western philosophy (often subsumed under the vague term "objectivism"). This book contrasts with most other critical approaches to experientialism by providing close readings of key passages from the works of Lakoff and Johnson, which enables the author to pinpoint theory-internal inconsistencies and other shortcomings not noted in previous publications. This book will be relevant to students and scholars interested in semantics and cognitive linguistics, and also in psychology and philosophy of language.