The Arab revolutions of 2011 were a transformative moment in the modern history of the Middle East, as people rose up against long-standing autocrats throughout the region to call for 'bread, freedom and dignity'. With the passage of time, results have been decidedly mixed, with tentative success stories like Tunisia contrasting with the emergence of even more repressive dictatorships in places like Egypt, with the backing of several Gulf states. Focusing primarily on Egypt, this book considers a relatively understudied dimension of these revolutions: the role of prominent religious scholars. While pro-revolutionary ulama have justified activism against authoritarian regimes, counter-revolutionary scholars have provided religious backing for repression, and in some cases the mass murder of unarmed protestors. Usaama al-Azami traces the public engagements and religious pronouncements of several prominent ulama in the region, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ali Gomaa and Abdullah bin Bayyah, to explore their role in either championing the Arab revolutions or supporting their repression. He concludes that while a minority of noted scholars have enthusiastically endorsed the counter-revolutions, their approach is attributable less to premodern theology and more to their distinctly modern commitment to the authoritarian state.

Radical Arab nationalism emerged in the modern era as a response to European political and cultural domination, culminating in a series of military coups in the mid-20th century in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. This movement heralded the dawn of modern, independent nations that would close the economic, social, scientific, and military gaps with the West while building a unity of Arab nations. But this dream failed. In fact, radical Arab nationalism became a barrier to civil peace and national cohesion, most tragically demonstrated in the case of Syria, for two reasons: 1) national armies militarized nationalism and its political objectives; 2) these nations did not keep pace with the intellectual and political and cultural and social progress of European nations that offered, for example, freedom of speech and thought. It was the failure of radical Arab nationalism, Addi contends, that made the more recent political Islam so popular. But if radical nationalism militarized politics, the Islamists politicized religion. Today, the prevailing medieval interpretation of Islam, defended by the Islamists, prevents these nations from making progress and achieving the kind of social justice that radical Arab nationalism once promised. Will political Islam fail, too? Can nations ruled by political Islam accommodate modernity? Their success or failure, Addi writes, depends upon this question.

During the 1980s, Islamic activists in the Arab Middle East have challenged the definition of "legitimate authority" and provided the means and rationale for revolutionary change, hoping to pressure established governments to alter domestic and foreign policies. No nation-state has been immune. Fearful Arab nationalist leaders, unwilling or unable to abandon decades of ideological baggage, have begun a gradual, if erratic, process of melding the spirit and letter of Islamic precepts into existing national laws and political rhetoric. Whether it is adequate to the challenge, the state nevertheless bears the onus of accommodation, because Islam and Arabism will not soon disappear. They will assume new form and substance in the changing realities of the region. Dilemmas inherent to this century and the gauntlet delivered to hitherto unquestioned political caveats will continue to exacerbate the competition between Islam and Arabism, their quest for political platforms and supporters, and the credibility of all other claimants, including the state. Visions of the future, especially when they are sacred and apocalyptic, can never be entirely freed of historical, emotive baggage. Even if Islamic political activism and pan-Arabism diminish in their intensity, they will endure as subtle, formative forces in all aspects of life. Indigenous inhabitants are fully aware that these influences have profound resonance in their lives. At the same time, these forces act like invisible sentinels in the mind, standing ready to cast a long shadow as unconscious motivators of political behavior. Sections are as follows: Declaration of Crisis; Pluralism: Minorities in the Arab World; Stateless Nations and Nationless States: Twentieth Century Disunity; Search for Unity: An Arab Sunni Core; Arabs and Non-Arabs: The Myth of Equality; Fatal Wounds: Universal Islam Takes the Offensive; and The State: Visionary Futures.

Over the past decade, the political ground beneath the Middle East has shifted. Arab nationalism the political orthodoxy for most of this century has lost its grip on the imagination and allegiance of a new generation. At the same time, Islam as an ideology has spread across the region, and "Islamists" bid to capture the center of politics. Most Western scholars and experts once hailed the redemptive power of Arabism. Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival is a critical assessment of the contradictions of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, and the misrepresentation of both in the West. The first part of the book argues that Arab nationalism--the so-called Arab awakening--bore within it the seeds of its own failure. Arabism as an idea drew upon foreign sources and resources. Even as it claimed to liberate the Arabs from imperialism it deepened intellectual dependence upon the West's own romanticism and radicalism. Ultimately, Arab nationalism became a force of oppression rather than liberation, and a mirror image of the imperialism it defied. Kramer's essays together form the only chronological telling and the at fully documented postmortem of Arabism. The second part of the book examines the similar failings of Islamism, whose ideas are Islamic reworkings of Western ideological radicalism. Its effect has been to give new life to old rationales for oppression, authoritarianism, and sectarian division. Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival provides an alternative view of a century of Middle Eastern history. As the region moves fitfully past ideology, Kramer's perspective is more compelling than at any time in the past-in Western academe no less than among many in the Middle. This book will be of interest to sociologists, political scientists, economists, and Middle East specialists.

In this new edition Professor Tibi analyses the impact and function of nationalism and its contribution to social and political change in the Third World, taking the rise of nationalism in the Middle East as a historical example. He concentrates on the period after the First World War, when many Arab intellectuals became disillusioned with Britain and France as a result of the occupation of their countries. Professor Tibi's careful study of the writings and influence of Sati' al-Husri illustrates the connection between modern Arab nationalism and nineteenth century German Romantic nationalism, which will be of particular interest to the English reader. Professor Tibi concludes that while nationalism has played a necessary and important role in the movement for national independence in the Middle East, it has since developed into an ideology which seems to obstruct further social and political emancipation. This book will be of particular interest to historians and social scientists as well as to specialists in the area itself.

One of the most important developments in the modern history of the Middle East, the so-called Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, bringing down dictators, sparking a civil war in Libya, and igniting a bloody uprising in Syria. Its long-term repercussions in Egypt and elsewhere remain unclear. Now one of the world's leading Islamic thinkers examines and explains it, in this searching, provocative, and necessary book. Time Magazine named Tariq Ramadan one of the most important innovators of the twenty-first century. A Muslim intellectual and prolific author, he has won global renown for his reflections on Islam and the contemporary challenges in both the Muslim majority societies and the West. In Islam and the Arab Awakening, he explores the uprisings, offering rare insight into their origin, significance, and possible futures. As early as 2003, he writes, there had been talk of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa. The U.S. government and private organizations set up networks and provided training for young leaders, especially in the use of the Internet and social media, and the West abandoned its unconditional support of authoritarian governments. But the West did not create the uprisings. Indeed, one lesson Ramadan presents is that these mass movements and their consequences cannot be totally controlled. Something irreversible has taken place: dictators have been overthrown without weapons. But, he writes, democratic processes are only beginning to emerge, and unanswered questions remain. What role will religion play? How should Islamic principles and goals be rethought? Can a sterile, polarizing debate between Islamism and secularism be avoided? Avoiding both naive confidence and conspiratorial paranoia, Ramadan voices a tentative optimism. If a true civil society can be established, he argues, this moment's fragile hope will live.

Today about 85 per cent of the world population of Muslims live in areas outside the Arab world, and due to population growth, missionary endeavours and migration, the number of Muslims in these areas is rising rapidly. This volume presents the spread and character of Islam in many non-Arab countries, focusing particularly on the contemporary situation. The book deals with the great variety and complexity that characterize Islam outside the Arab world, with Sufism (the predominant form of Islam in most non-Arab Muslim countries), and with the growing significance of Islamism which challenges secularism and Sufi forms of Islam.