The most effective regulators in developing countries are following remarkably similar approaches. The main common element across "best practice" countries is the use of relatively simple quantitative models of operators' behavior and constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the operators, the users, and the government. The authors provide an introduction to the design and use of these models. They draw on lessons from international experience in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of capital, including the various types of risks specific to the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are involved. Because these variables change over time, scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator. These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a company but take a longer term view and include an explicit identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the business on the one hand and debt service and operational expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of the operators. They can also account for a large number of key policy factors including access and affordability concerns for various types of consumers. They generally account for the sensitivity of operators and users to various regulatory design options.

The most effective regulators in developing countries are following remarkably similar approaches. The main common element across "best practice" countries is the use of relatively simple quantitative models of operators' behavior and constraints to measure the impact of regulatory decisions on some key financial and economic indicators of concern to the operators, the users, and the government. The authors provide an introduction to the design and use of these models. They draw on lessons from international experience in industrial and developing countries in ordinary or extraordinary revisions and in the context of contract renegotiations. Simplifying somewhat, these models force regulators to recognize that, in the long run, private operators need to at least cover their opportunity cost of capital, including the various types of risks specific to the country, the sector, or the projects with which they are involved. Because these variables change over time, scheduled revisions are needed to allow for adjustments in the key determinants of the rate of return of the operator. These revisions are a recognition of the fact that all these determinants-tariffs, subsidies, quality, investments, and other service obligations-are interrelated and jointly determine the rate of return. At every revision, the rules of the game for the regulator are exactly the same: to figure out the changes in the cost of capital and to adjust the variables driving the rate of return to ensure that it continues to be consistent with the cost of capital. If they can draw on reasonable data, these models do everything any financial model would do for the day-to-day management of a company but take a longer term view and include an explicit identification of the key regulatory instruments. They can monitor the consistency between cash flow generated by the business on the one hand and debt service and operational expense needs on the other to address the main concerns of the operators. They can also account for a large number of key policy factors including access and affordability concerns for various types of consumers. They generally account for the sensitivity of operators and users to various regulatory design options.

This title provides a practical guide for regulators, policy-makers, and utility managers for establishing regulatory accounts that can be the cornerstone for better, more complete, and more reliable information. It sets out the essential accounting features of regulatory accounts and provides practical guidance on controversial areas such as cost allocation, asset valuation, and depreciation. It emphasizes the essential requirements for consistency with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

This monograph is concerned with the determination of the allowed rate ofreturn in rate cases which, in part, determines the rates ofcharge to customers of public utilities. Rate of return determination has been a central topic in utility regulation for a century. Recent changes in the traditionally regulated markets - electricity, gas, and telephone - have shoved discussion of rate of return determination into the background, replacing it by technology changes, competition, downsizing, deregulation, and reg'ulatory incentive systems. These new issues have made the regula tory sector, which had the reputation of being stodgy and uninteresting, an exciting field ofstudy. But rate ofreturn is not dead. It will playa key role in whatever the new structure ofthe regulated sector. Separating generation from transmis sion and distribution will not eliminate the need for rate of return analysis in the electric utility industry. Rather, it may well increase the number of companies for which the rate of return needs to be determined. It will playa fundamental role in the new regulatory environment. Incentive systems in the regulated sector may be the wave of the future but they will use the required rate ofreturn as a benchmark. Rate case will persist. Most rate cases include opposing testimony as to the "fair" rate of return or even the cost ofcapital for a public utility whose rates are at issue.

Risk and risk allocation have always been central issues in public utility regulation. Unfortunately, the term “risk” can easily be misrepresented and misinterpreted, especially when disconnected from long-standing principles of corporate finance. This book provides those in the regulatory policy community with a basic theoretical and practical grounding in risk as it relates specifically to economic regulation in order to focus and elevate discourse about risk in the utility sector in the contemporary context of economic, technological, and regulatory change. This is not a “how-to” book with regard to calculating risks and returns but rather a resource that aims to improve understanding of the nature of risk. It draws from the fields of corporate finance, behavioral finance, and decision theory as well as the broader legal and economic theories that undergird institutional economics and the economic regulatory paradigm. We exist in a world of scarce resources and abundant uncertainties, the combination of which can exacerbate and distort our sense of risk. Although there is understandable impulse to reduce risk, attempts to mitigate may be as likely to shift risk, and some measures might actually increase risk exposure. Many of the concepts explored here apply not just to financial decisions, such as those by utility investors, but also to regulatory and utility decision-making in general.