This book undertakes an in-depth examination of the dynamics of commitment in U.S.-Southeast Asia strategy. Drawing on cases including the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Washington’s pivot to Asia amid China’s growing regional role, it constructs an original balance of commitment model to explain continuity and change in U.S.-Southeast Asia policy. Balance of commitment goes beyond balance of power approaches to explains how translating Southeast Asia’s importance in U.S. thinking into actual commitments has proven challenging for policymakers as it requires simultaneously calibrating adjustments to power shifts, threat perceptions and resource extraction. The book applies the balance of commitment approach to several practical case studies, based on hundreds of conversations with policymakers and experts in the United States and Southeast Asia, personal experiences across nearly two decades and primary and secondary source material across a half-century. The findings suggest that the challenges of U.S. commitment to the region are rooted not simply in differences between administrations or divergences in outlook between Washington and regional capitals, but tough balancing acts for U.S. policymakers in domestic politics and wider foreign policy. As such, shaping U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia and calibrating and sustaining commitment requires not just appreciating Southeast Asia’s significance, but committing to the region in ways that manage structural aspects of U.S. thinking, capabilities and resourcing.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- One: The Buddhist World and the United States at the Onset of the Cold War, 1941-1954 -- Two: Washington Formulates a Buddhist Policy, 1954-1957 -- Three: Thailand and the International Buddhist Arena, 1956-1962 -- Four: Reforming the Monks: The Cold War and Clerical Education in Thailand and Laos, 1954-1961 -- Five: Thailand and the International Response to the 1963 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam -- Six: Enforcing the Code: South Vietnam's "Struggle Movement" and the Limits of Thai Buddhist Conservatism -- Seven: Thailand's Buddhist Hierarchy Confronts Its Challengers, 1967-1975 -- Eight: The Rage of Thai Buddhism, 1975-1980 -- Conclusion: From Byoto to Kittivudho -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z

Barack Obama’s "rebalancing" or "pivot" strategy, intended to demonstrate continued US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic contexts, was launched with much fanfare in 2011. Implicit in the new strategy is both a focus on China – engagement with, and containment of – and a heavy reliance by the United States on its existing friends and allies in the region in order to implement its strategy. This book explores the impact of the new strategy on America’s regional friends and allies. It shows how these governments are working with Washington to advance and protect their distinct national interests, while at the same time avoiding any direct confrontation with China. It also addresses the reasons why many of these regional actors harbour concerns about the ability of the US to sustain the pivot strategy in the long run. Overall, the book illustrates the deep complexities of the United States’ exercise of power and influence in the region.

Geography encompasses everything from the local—where human beings live, work, and travel—to metageographies like nations and regions. James A. Tyner's inventive and multidisciplinary ideas on geography similarly range from the personal—his father's experience in the military during the Vietnam War—to a broad discussion of how the United States has come to exercise power through the production of geographic knowledge, in this case in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Second World War, Southeast Asia has served as a surrogate space to further American imperial interests, which are economic, political, territorial, and moral in scope. America's Strategy in Southeast Asia contends that the construction of Southeast Asia as a geographic entity has been a crucial component in the creation of the American empire. For example, America's most blatant experience of colonial rule occurred the Philippines, America's longest war was fought in Vietnam, and most recently, some American policymakers have identified Southeast Asia as the "Second Front" in the War on Terror. Yet, America's overriding strategy in Southeast Asia and the region itself remains something of a mystery for the American populace—a "black box" in America's geographical imagination. This clear and innovative book educates readers about Southeast Asia's importance in American foreign policy.

The most complete picture to date of how U.S. strategies of containment and empire-building spiraled out of control in Southeast Asia, investigating also how the demoralizing experience of Vietnam radically undermined U.S. enthusiasm for the region in a strategic sense.

Soon after the American Revolution, ?certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.

Michael Lind casts new light on one of the most contentious episodes in American history in this controversial bestseller. In this groundgreaking reinterpretation of America's most disatrous and controversial war, Michael Lind demolishes enduring myths and put the Vietnam War in its proper context—as part of the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Lind reveals the deep cultural divisions within the United States that made the Cold War consensus so fragile and explains how and why American public support for the war in Indochina declined. Even more stunning is his provacative argument that the United States failed in Vietnam because the military establishment did not adapt to the demands of what before 1968 had been largely a guerrilla war. In an era when the United States so often finds itself embroiled in prolonged and difficult conflicts, Lind offers a sobering cautionary tale to Ameicans of all political viewpoints.