The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

Nation-building that is, the use of military force to introduce democratic values is not an activity that comes naturally to Americans, the Rand team believes. The post-World War II reconstruction of Germany and Japan were anomalies forced by circumstance, isolated endeavors now vanished into a haze of greatest generation memory. The mission of America's military forces is warfighting. Post-combat stabilization and reconstruction operations are best left to the United Nations. Neither the Departments of State nor Defense place nation-building high on their "to do" list. So aberrational is nation-building for the United States, so unique and unlikely-to-be-repeated is each excursion into national rehabilitation, that every mission virtually starts from scratch. All that must change, say the authors, because with the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq comes the requirement to assemble regimes sympathetic to democratic values. Nation-building, it appears, has become the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower (xv). Even the once reconstruction shy Bush administration now shoulders the white man's burden. If post-war reconstruction is our fate, we best sharpen our nation-building skills and fast. The Rand team has assembled a quick primer a "'how to' manual" Ambassador Paul Bremer classifies America's Role in Nation-Building on a jacket blurb that draws lessons from seven post-conflict reconstruction cases involving U.S. forces, beginning with the successful post-1945 rehabilitations of Germany and Japan, through the Somalia disaster, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and finally Afghanistan. While fully acknowledging that every case is unique, the Rand team believes nonetheless that the past is a prologue that U.S. nation-builders can profitably mine for reconstruction policy and strategy guidance in Iraq.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush Administration. It rejects the ’rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Brazinsky explains why South Korea was one of the few postcolonial nations that achieved rapid economic development and democratization by the end of the twentieth century. He contends that a distinctive combination of American initiatives and Korean agency enabled South Korea's stunning transformation. Expanding the framework of traditional diplomatic history, Brazinsky examines not only state-to-state relations, but also the social and cultural interactions between Americans and South Koreans. He shows how Koreans adapted, resisted, and transformed American influence and promoted socioeconomic change that suited their own aspirations. Ultimately, Brazinsky argues, Koreans' capacity to tailor American institutions and ideas to their own purposes was the most important factor in the making of a democratic South Korea.

In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.

How and why did the United States get involved in nation-building overseas, and how have these policies evolved? How has Washington understood the relationship between development abroad and security at home, and how has this translated into policy? What is the relationship between security, order and development in nation-building and stabilisation efforts? This book explores the processes through which nation-building approaches originated and developed over the last seven decades as well as the concepts and motivations that shaped them. Weaving together International Relations theory and a rich history drawing mainly on declassified documents, interviews and other primary sources, this book contributes to theoretical discussions of nation-building while offering a critique of Realist and Critical Security School analyses of US policy in the developing world. Ultimately, the book illuminates lessons relevant to today’s nation-building, crisis management, stability, 'good governance' and reconstruction missions.

What do we owe Iraq? America is up to its neck in nation building--but the public debate, focused on getting the troops home, devotes little attention to why we are building a new Iraqi nation, what success would look like, or what principles should guide us. What We Owe Iraq sets out to shift the terms of the debate, acknowledging that we are nation building to protect ourselves while demanding that we put the interests of the people being governed--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or elsewhere--ahead of our own when we exercise power over them. Noah Feldman argues that to prevent nation building from turning into a paternalistic, colonialist charade, we urgently need a new, humbler approach. Nation builders should focus on providing security, without arrogantly claiming any special expertise in how successful nation-states should be made. Drawing on his personal experiences in Iraq as a constitutional adviser, Feldman offers enduring insights into the power dynamics between the American occupiers and the Iraqis, and tackles issues such as Iraqi elections, the prospect of successful democratization, and the way home. Elections do not end the occupier's responsibility. Unless asked to leave, we must resist the temptation of a military pullout before a legitimately elected government can maintain order and govern effectively. But elections that create a legitimate democracy are also the only way a nation builder can put itself out of business and--eventually--send its troops home. Feldman's new afterword brings the Iraq story up-to-date since the book's original publication in 2004, and asks whether the United States has acted ethically in pushing the political process in Iraq while failing to control the security situation; it also revisits the question of when, and how, to withdraw.