A revealing look at presidential politics and foreign policy-making from the aftermath of Vietnam to the NATO intervention in Kosovo. The book illuminates the relationship between presidents' domestic and foreign policy priorities and the key role of public opinion in constraining presidential initiatives, particularly the ability of a president to use military force overseas. In case studies ranging from the invasion of Grenada through the Gulf War and the dilemmas of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, Melanson provides compelling portraits of presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton, and their different efforts to forge a foreign policy consensus.

This book integrates the study of presidential politics and foreign policy-making from the Vietnam aftermath to the events following September 11 and the Iraqi War. Focusing on the relationship between presidents' foreign policy agendas and domestic politics, it offers compelling portraits of presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II. In the course of comparing the efforts of these presidents to articulate a clear conception of the national interest and to forge a foreign policy consensus, the author shows the key role of public opinion in constraining presidential initiatives, in particular the decision to use military force overseas. Never more timely, this popular text is appropriate for courses in U.S. foreign policy, the presidency, or contemporary U.S. politics.

The war in Vietnam achieved almost none of the goals the American decision-makers formulated, and it cost more than 56,000 American lives. Yet, until recently, Americans have preferred to ignore the causes and consequences of this disaster by treating the war as an aberration in United States foreign policy, an unfortunate but unique mistake. What are the "lessons" of Vietnam? Many previous discussions have focused on narrow or misleading questions, rehashing military decisions, for example, or offering blow-by-blow accounts of Washington infighting, or castigating foreign-policy decision-makers. Michael Sullivan undertakes instead a broad and systematic treatment of the American experience in Vietnam, using a variety of theoretical perspectives to study several aspects of that experience, including the decision-making process and decision-makers' perceptions of the war; public opinion and "mood" before, during, and after the war; and the Vietnam War in relation to the Cold War and to power structures and patterns of violence in the international system. The major goal of The Vietnam War: A Study in the Making of American Policy is to show that the American experience, not only in Vietnam but elsewhere in the world, must be understood as an integral part of the processes of both American foreign policy and international politics. Sullivan demonstrates the importance of using a variety of empirical and quantitative evidence to study foreign policy and of relating a specific historical situation like the Vietnam War to broader theories of international relations.

As National Security Advisor to President Gerald Ford, advisor to President Ronald Reagan, and as National Security Advisor to President George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft was at the center of the ongoing debate over how to shape American foreign policy in the post-war world. As David F. Schmitz makes clear in his new biography, Scowcroft was a realist in his outlook on American foreign policy and an heir to the Cold War internationalism that had shaped that policy since 1945. The type of bi-partisan cooperation and internationalism that marked the pre-Vietnam War years served as Scowcroft's guide to how to defend American interests and promote U.S. values and institutions globally. While not always successful, Scowcroft provided a consistent internationalist voice in the midst of change.

This important text offers a clear, concise and affordable narrative and analytical history of American foreign policy since the Spanish-American War. The book narrates events and policies but goes further to emphasize the international setting and constraints within which American policy-makers had to operate, the domestic pressures on those policy-makers, and the ideologies, preferences, and personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders themselves.

This book examines the history of US foreign policy since the Vietnam War. It focuses on four themes: the legacy of Vietnam; the ending and aftermath of the Cold War; the debate over American international decline; and the frequently undemocratic conduct of US foreign policy. The book considers alternative explanations for the Cold War's end. It evaluates the foreign policy leadership of Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton and assesses prospects for US foreign policy after the Cold War.