It was a great pleasure to find such a rich analysis of the role of national parliaments in the EU. What I particularly like - and what proves to be particularly fruitful is the combination of perspectives; the EU law and national constitutional perspective including a comparative dimension, the perspective that explains the role of national parliaments in the EU from past to present (and even near future) and last but not least, the perspective of the interaction between the legal frameworks and the political reality. There is every reason to congratulate Adam Cygan wholeheartedly on this book. Ton Van Den Brink, Europa Instituut Utrecht, The Netherlands One of the most outstanding specialists on the role of national parliaments in the EU has produced another impressive book about this dynamic topic. It provides an illuminating overview of current practices, it sharply analyses the legal status quo, and it brings theoretical depth to the topic in multiple perspectives. Olaf Tans, Amsterdam University College, The Netherlands This accessible and detailed book takes an interdisciplinary approach in exploring the position of national parliaments in the EU polity and in particular their position within the EU governance framework. Adam Cygan analyses the impact of subsidiarity monitoring upon national parliaments and to what extent this provides new opportunities for national parliaments to be engaged in, and exert influence over, the EU legislative process. While the post-Lisbon position of national parliaments may have improved, this book questions whether national parliaments can really be considered as central actors in EU affairs. The author also queries whether subsidiarity monitoring has the capacity to create a collective bloc of horizontal actors which exert effective accountability over the EU legislative process. Accountability, Parliamentarism and Transparency in the EU will strongly appeal to academics, parliamentarians/parliamentary officials working in EU affairs, as well as EU civil servants.

There seems to be a growing tendency, as prominently shown by the fall of the Santer Commission in 1999 and expressed more recently in the Constitutional Treaty, to construe the relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament as a parliamentary system. In a parliamentary system the government gives account of its action to Parliament and, where appropriate, suffers the consequences, takes the blame, or puts matters right if errors have been made. The government remains in office only as long as it has the confidence of the majority in Parliament and until Parliament votes a motion of censure or the government resigns. This study further develops a European concept of political accountability. The basic assumption of the project is that such a concept must be firmly rooted in the longstanding constitutional traditions of the Member States. From this perspective, it is relevant to try to identify what political accountability precisely means in the various Member States. This proves to be far from evident. The concept of political accountability substantially differs from country to country. For example, political accountability in Italy and France primarily seems to focus on resignation of ministers whereas political accountability in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands aims at the process of giving account. In order to analyze the various approaches and to try to identify common principles, this book brings together 12 distinguished constitutional lawyers and political scientists who have analyzed the concept of political accountability from their national perspectives. The book also includes a final comparative chapter that examines the parallels and the differences between the national systems and explores to what extent common ground can be found in Europe.

The European Union's growing accountability deficit threatens to undermine its legitimacy; accordingly, member states have agreed to negotiate a new set of Treaty changes in 2004. These essays consider various aspects of accountability and legitimacy in the European Union.

Oversight of executives has always been a key function of parliaments and one that is central to developing the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. However, in reality governments are taking a more pronounced role in controlling legislation, diluting the influence of parliament. This book plots this trend in parliaments across Europe, to illustrate points of convergence and divergence. In so doing, it suggest tools and methods that parliaments can develop to bolster their crucial oversight role.

This book considers national parliaments’ and the European Parliament’s role in European Union (EU) economic governance. It examines the recent strengthening of parliamentary involvement, limitations to improvements, and where and how democratic deficits still exist. It also provides the basis for some reflections concerning possible future evolutions and improvements to EU economic governance. The EU’s economic governance framework has been significantly strengthened as a response to the 2008 economic and financial crisis, and the establishment of a new Banking Union in 2013. It is thus key to determine whether these additional transfers of powers to the EU level have been accompanied by an equivalent empowerment of the national and European legislatures, allowing them to ensure adequate democratic legitimation. The chapters comprehensively re-examine the democratic (throughput) legitimacy of, and within, the EU’s economic governance by focusing on national parliaments, on the European Parliament, and on mechanisms for interparliamentary cooperation. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

The issue of competence division is of fundamental importance as it reflects the 'power bargain' struck between the Member States and their Union, determining the limits of the authority of the EU as well as the limits of the authority of the Member States. It defines the nature of the EU as a polity, as well as the identity of the Member States. After over six years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is high time to take stock of whether the reforms that were adopted to make the Union's system of division of competences between the EU Member States clearer, more coherent, and better at containing European integration, have been successful. This book asks whether 'the competence problem' has finally been solved. Given the fundamental importance of this question, this publication will be of interest to a wide audience, from constitutional and substantive EU law scholars to practitioners in the EU institutions and EU legal practice more generally.