On March 15, 1916, the 1st Aero Squadron arrived at Columbus, New Mexico. Led by Captain Benjamin D. Foulois, the squadron included 11 officers, 82 enlisted men, and 1 civilian technician. The men unloaded an automobile, 6 motorcycles, and 12 motor trucks, vehicles rare in an army still wedded to the horse and mule. These were followed by wooden crates containing 8 wood, wire, and fabric Curtiss JN-3 biplanes, every airplane owned by the U.S. Army, save those assigned to its aviation school at San Diego, California. The squadron was in Columbus to join an expedition commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. President Woodrow Wilson had ordered Pershing's force into Mexico in response to a March 9 attack on the tiny border town by the Mexican desperado, Francisco "Pancho" Villa. For the first time, the U.S. Army's entire air force -- the 1st Aero Squadron -- had deployed for an active campaign. The 1st Aero Squadron played a significant role in the Punitive Expedition, but, in dramatic contrast to how an air force functions today, it served as a means of communication and observation, not as a combatant arm. Some experiments with bombs and machine guns had been conducted, and the war in Europe was quickly turning the airplane into a serious weapon of war. Nevertheless, U.S. Army leaders envisioned aviation's primary mission to be the receipt and transmission of information for tactical commanders and long-distance scouting as an adjunct to the cavalry. Accordingly, during the mobile phase of the Punitive Expedition, the 1st Aero Squadron enabled Pershing to locate and communicate with his widely dispersed, fast-moving columns and carried dispatches between Pershing's main and advanced bases. The squadron also scouted for hostile forces and kept a watch for threats to Pershing's line of communications. These efforts were made in some of the worst weather and poorest conditions imaginable, and by the end of April, all eight airplanes had been destroyed7.

On March 15, 1916, the 1st Aero Squadron arrived at Columbus, New Mexico, its train steaming into the crowded, chaotic town at 9:15 in the morning. Led by Capt. Benjamin D. Foulois, a lantern-jawed, bantam-weight former enlisted man, the squadron included eleven officers, eighty-two enlisted men, and one civilian technician. Under Foulois's direction, the men unloaded an automobile, six motorcycles, and twelve motor trucks, vehicles rare in 1916 New Mexico and even rarer in an army still wedded to the horse and mule. These were followed by wooden crates containing eight wood, wire, and fabric Curtiss JN-3 biplanes, every airplane owned by the U.S. Army, save those assigned to its aviation school at San Diego, California. The squadron was in Columbus to join an expedition commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. President Woodrow Wilson had ordered Pershing's force into Mexico in response to a March 9 attack on the tiny border town by the Mexican desperado, Francisco "Pancho" Villa. The event was auspicious. For the first time, the U.S. Army's entire air force-the 1st Aero Squadron-had deployed for an active campaign. The course of the Punitive Expedition can be quickly summarized. Pershing's forces crossed into Mexico on March 15, 1916, and for the next month, several carefully coordinated cavalry columns pressed southward hrough the state of Chihuahua in an effort to locate Villa, while trying to avoid confrontations with troops loyal to the Mexican government, who were unhelpful at best and often downright unfriendly. Behind the cavalry, the expedition was supported along a lengthening line of communications extending from Columbus through bases at Colonia Dublán, Namiquipa, Bachíniva, SanAntonio de los Arenales, and Satevó, the last over three hundred miles from the United States. The hard-riding cavalry ultimately reached Parral, another seven-ty miles south of Satevó, where a fight with Mexican government forces on April 15 marked the southern terminus of the American advance. Subsequently, at the limit of his logistic capability and concerned about threats to his extended line of communications, Pershing assumed a defensive posture. He organized the area controlled by the Punitive Expedition into districts, each patrolled by a cavalry regiment that harried guerrillas and kept an eye on government forces. Pershing maintained this position until the Punitive Expedition withdrew from Mexico early in 1917. The 1st Aero Squadron played a significant role in the Punitive Expedition, but, in dramatic contrast to how an air force functions today, it served as a means of communication and observation, not as a combatant arm. Some experiments with bombs and machine guns had been conducted, and the war in Europe was quickly turning the airplane into a serious weapon of war. Nevertheless, U.S. Army leaders envisioned aviation's primary mission to be the receipt and trans mission of information for tactical commanders and long-distance scouting as an adjunct to the cavalry. Accordingly, during the mobile phase of the Punitive Expedition, the 1st Aero Squadron enabled Pershing to locate and communicate with his widely dispersed, fast-moving columns and carried dispatches between Pershing's main and advanced bases. The squadron also scouted for hostile forces and kept a watch for threats to Pershing's line of communications. As will be seen, these efforts were made in some of the worst weather and poorest conditions imaginable, and by the end of April, all eight airplanes had been destroyed. During the static phase of the Punitive Expedition, the 1st Aero Squadron remained at Columbus, where Foulois and his men operated a test and evaluation program for a wide variety of airplanes and aviation equipment. During both phases of the campaign, the officers and men of the 1st Aero Squadron learned lessons about airplanes, equipment, and operations in the field that would be applied in France less than a year later.

The author, working with the U.S. Air Force, documents one of the first combat deployments of air power by U.S. Armed forces.During the Mexican Revolution, hundreds of Pancho Villa's horsemen crossed the United States border and raided Columbus, New Mexico on 9 March 1916. The town was looted and burned, and 17 Americans were killed by Villa's men.President Wilson ordered General John J. (Black Jack) Pershing to "pursue and disperse," the forces commanded by Villa. Along with Pershing came the Army Signal Corps' 1st Aero Squadron to be used for observation support of the ground forces. A fascinating account of a little known interlude in American history; thoroughly documented and illustrated.

On March 15, 1916, the 1st Aero Squadron arrived at Columbus, NM. The squadron was to join an expedition led by BG John J. "Black Jack" Pershing into Mexico in response to a March 9 attack on the tiny border town by the Mexican desperado, Francisco "Pancho" Villa. For the first time, the U.S. Army's entire air force-the 1st Aero Squadron-had deployed for an active campaign. The Squadron played a significant role in the Punitive Expedition, but, in dramatic contrast to how an air force functions today, it served as a means of communication and observation, not as a combatant arm. (Originally published by the Air Force History and Museums Program)

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.