Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.

The investigation and modelling of aviation accident causation is dominated by linear models. Aviation is, however, a complex system and as such suffers from being artificially manipulated into non-complex models and methods. This book addresses this issue by developing a new approach to investigating aviation accident causation through information networks. These networks centralise communication and the flow of information as key indicators of a system’s health and risk. This holistic approach focuses on the system environment, the activity that takes place within it, the strategies used to conduct this activity, the way in which the constituent parts of the system (both human and non-human) interact and the behaviour required. Each stage of this book identifies and expands upon the potential of the information network approach, maintaining firm focus on the overall health of a system. The book’s new model offers many potential developments and some key areas are studied in this research. Through the centralisation of barriers and information nodes the method can be applied to almost any situation. The application of Bayesian mathematics to historical data populations provides scope for studying error migration and barrier manipulation. The book also provides application of these predictions to a flight simulator study for the purposes of validation. Beyond this it also discusses the applicability of the approach to industry. Through working with a legacy airline the methods discussed are used as the basis for a new and prospective safety management system.

This title was first published in 2002: This volume presents a method to investigate the human performance issues associated with an accident or incident, with a detailed discussion of the types of data to collect, and methods of collecting and analyzing data. The book should be of interest to accident/incident investigators, specialists in nuclear, chemical processing, aviation and other critical industries, safety experts, researchers and students in the field of human error, human factors, ergonomics and industrial engineering, and government agencies for regulation, health and safety.

This book provides an overview of, and practical guidance on, the range of human factors (HF) methods that can be used for the purposes of accident analysis and investigation in complex sociotechnical systems. Human Factors Methods and Accident Analysis begins with an overview of different accident causation models and an introduction to the concepts of accident analysis and investigation. It then presents a discussion focussing on the importance of, and difficulties associated with, collecting appropriate data for accident analysis purposes. Following this, a range of HF-based accident analysis methods are described, as well as step-by-step guidance on how to apply them. To demonstrate how the different methods are applied, and what the outputs are, the book presents a series of case study applications across a range of safety critical domains. It concludes with a chapter focussing on the data challenges faced when collecting, coding and analysing accident data, along with future directions in the area. Human Factors Methods and Accident Analysis is the first book to offer a practical guide for investigators, practitioners and researchers wishing to apply accident analysis methods. It is also unique in presenting a series of novel applications of accident analysis methods, including HF methods not previously used for these purposes (e.g. EAST, critical path analysis), as well as applications of methods in new domains.

Most aviation accidents are attributed to human error, pilot error especially. Human error also greatly effects productivity and profitability. In his overview of this collection of papers, the editor points out that these facts are often misinterpreted as evidence of deficiency on the part of operators involved in accidents. Human factors research reveals a more accurate and useful perspective: The errors made by skilled human operators - such as pilots, controllers, and mechanics - are not root causes but symptoms of the way industry operates. The papers selected for this volume have strongly influenced modern thinking about why skilled experts make errors and how to make aviation error resilient.

The Limits of Expertise reports a study of the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reported in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step.

As part of the national effort to improve aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chartered the National Research Council to examine and recommend improvements in the aircraft certification process currently used by the FAA, manufacturers, and operators.