This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894–1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937–1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s—a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China’s coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides—at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat—a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

‘The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy’ includes 14 historical case studies that help to illuminate a number of special characteristics of the modern-day Chinese navy most Chinese naval officers perhaps take for granted, including a belief in the Mandate of Heaven, tributary system and the fear of ‘losing face’ either in a diplomatic setting or by risking valuable equipment in battle. Ethnic and language differences, regional loyalties and political mistrust potentially exacerbate these problems. Special peculiarities include the Mongol dual-officer diarchy that led to the political commissar system utilized by the People’s Liberation Army. Outside influences, such as blockade, sanctions or embargoes, can exert a profound impact on China, just as foreign intervention or, equally important, a decision not to intervene, can often determine the outcome of major maritime events. [NP] The 14 case studies discuss many of these characteristics, while the Conclusion examines all case studies together and places them in a historical perspective. ‘The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy’assesses which of these historical characteristics and peculiarities are still present in full force in China and which ones may no longer have as great an impact on the contemporary Chinese navy.

This book explores the question “Why is the US Navy in the South China Sea at all?” It traces the history of diplomatic, economic, and military tensions among the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, outlining the origins of the United States-Vietnam relationship during the immediate post-World War II period, the turmoil of the Vietnam War during which China supported North Vietnam against a US-backed South Vietnam, and the decision of the US government to open relations with China beginning in 1972. It shows how from 1945–1975, the US government used its relations with Vietnam to exert diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on China to open negotiations leading to full recognition and further discusses the surprising action of the US Navy in 1974 to allow the Chinese Navy to take the Paracel Islands by force, thereby denying control over these islands to a united Vietnam, closely allied with the Soviet Union, which was the common enemy of both China and the USA. Overall, the book demonstrates how the presence of the US Navy in the South China Sea is a crucial element in much wider, global US strategy.

This book examines the origins of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy, the formation of the US government’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and the most recent revisions to this strategy that focus more specifically on China. Besides examining the details of this strategy formulation, the book explores the internal and external repercussions on the US Navy of the Pivot to Asia. It discusses the “Fat Leonard” scandal, which involved bribery and corruption in contracts for the maintenance of the US fleets in the region, and considers the sharp decrease in training and readiness of the Pacific fleet to support the pivot, which in turn led to serious maritime collisions. It also assesses the impact of the pivot on other countries in the region, engaging in the debate as to whether the pivot was necessary in order to convince the countries of the region that the United States had not lost its staying power, or whether the pivot managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse even while allowing the strategic situation in the Middle East and Europe to worsen as a result of neglect.

In 21 short case studies, this short book examines the distinctive coincidental history of America, Britain, and various Asian countries during the twentieth century. It covers a wide range of historical events, from American expansion into the Pacific to the creation of the Soviet gulags in Siberia to the end of the Vietnam War. Its main goal is to show how watershed historical events can often become layered or overlap each other, sometimes by intent but often merely by happenstance. As Ian Fleming once famously opined about actions in war: “Once is happenstance. Twice is a coincidence. Three times is enemy action.”