This important U.S. Army Training Support Package document presents information on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures for attacking convoys in Iraq (and now Afghanistan), as well as U.S. measures in effect to counter them. Specific areas of instruction include but are not limited to hardening vehicles, defending against attack, consolidation and reorganization, gun truck employment, various reports, battle drills, and basic instructions for setting up a convoy live fire exercise. The document states in part: "During this course of instruction you will learn to: Identify the threat; harden vehicles; conduct convoy briefing; execute motor movement; defend against attack; defend against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED); conduct convoy consolidation and reorganization; conduct actions at the Release Point (RP); describe the purpose and functions of the gun truck; identify gun truck crew duties; harden gun trucks; employ gun trucks; identify emerging enemy trends on the battlefield. The arrival of the Twenty-first Century brought with it a different way of doing business on the battlefield. This style of warfare, known as the Contemporary Operational Environment, or COE, will be the mode in which the United States Army fights for many years to come. COE is an asymmetric environment, meaning that one side is well manned, well-organized, and well-equipped, while the other side consists of an irregular guerrilla force incapable of fighting a conventional battle with any hope of victory. Concepts covered include VBIEDs, PBIEDs, gun trucks, armor and hardening, ambush defense, EFPs, kidnapping, gunnery tables, obstacle avoidance, MEDEVAC, box formation, convoy task organization, and convoy defense doctrine.The enemy weapon of choice is the improvised explosive device (IED), which is usually placed on or near the shoulder of a paved road most often within ten feet of the pavement. Most IED blasts come not from directly underneath the vehicle, but from the front at an oblique angle, or directly at the flank. Because of this, most efforts to armor vehicles in Iraq are oriented more heavily toward the doors and fenders than the floorboard. In other areas, such as Afghanistan, the predominant threat is land mines, which are buried on unimproved roads. IEDs are classified in three types: Static IEDs, Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIED) and Person Borne IEDs (PBIED). Although the method of delivery differs between the classes, the three types of IED often share the same characteristics. The most common type is the static IED. IEDs can be command detonated, victim actuated, or timed. Although IEDs can be detonated using mechanical means, they are most commonly detonated using hardwired systems, radio controlled systems, or more recently, passive infra-red sensors. Car alarms, battery-powered remote doorbells, remote controlled light switches, key fobs, remote controlled toys, handheld radios, long range cordless telephones, garage door openers, and cell phones are common means of detonation. Any and all types of insulated wire can be used to connect the detonator to the explosive. IEDs in Theater usually incorporate military ordnance, but they can be devised using non-military components as well. IEDs may be fashioned from mortar shells, artillery projectiles, anti-tank mines, diesel fuel or mogas, rockets, black powder, fertilizer, chemical explosives, household cleaning products, etc. IEDs can be daisy chained. A daisy chain is two or more explosive devices wired together so that a single signal will detonate all the munitions at once. Daisy chained IEDs are not limited to one side of the road. They may be placed on both sides, and configured to detonate simultaneouslyThis is a privately authored news service and educational publication of Progressive Management.

The effort to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq is fully explained in this comprehensive two-part encyclopedia compilation, featuring the Convoy Survivability Training Support Package presenting information on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures for attacking convoys, as well as U.S. measures in effect to counter them.IED REPORT: Updated with the latest information from the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it also includes the results of Congressional inquiries into jamming the IED assembly line by impeding the flow of ammonium nitrate in south and central Asia. A recent GAO report on the JIEDDO effort is also reproduced. The JIEDDO solicitation of proposals for the development of innovative capabilities to defeat IEDs employed against dismounted U.S. or coalition forces anywhere in the world, but especially in Afghanistan is included. The military is looking for advances in the dismounted detection of buried IEDs and unmanned ground vehicles for dismount support. Buried IEDs are emplaced on or under the ground to be detonated in the proximity of Coalition Forces or other passers-by. IEDs are used on roadways, paths and choke points where intended victims are likely to walk. Devices are frequently emplaced in or near features (e.g. washouts, culverts, gates and bridges) that conceal their signatures and channel traffic over them. Components common to an IED are a switch, an initiator, a power source, and the main charge with container. The main charge is typically a homemade, fertilizer-based, bulk explosive in a plastic or fabric container. The most common switches for buried IEDs are victim operated pressure switches and command wires. IEDs are the enemy's fires system - their artillery. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy delivers these fires through networks that for centuries have formed the sinews of commerce for tribes and factions. IED attacks provide the enemy with a cheap, stand-off, precision targeting system that often provides attackers with complete anonymity. Coverage of IEDs and the JIEDDO includes: JIEDDO Annual Reports (including the newest for the Fiscal Year 2010), Acronyms and Terms, Glossary, DoD Directives, Urgent Needs and Readiness Levels, Technology Readiness Levels, Training for Forensics and Crime Scene Investigation to Battle IEDs, biographies of key officials in the JIEDDO, History of JIEDDO, The Threat, Organizational Structure, Organization Chart, Attacking the Network, Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), Keyhole, Information Operations, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon (ISR), Warrior Alpha, WTI, Constant Hawk, Technology Insertion Process, Identity InstaCheck, Palantir, more.CONVOY SURVIVABILITY TRAINING: Specific areas of instruction include but are not limited to hardening vehicles, defending against attack, consolidation and reorganization, gun truck employment, various reports, battle drills, and basic instructions for setting up a convoy live fire exercise. The document states in part: "During this course of instruction you will learn to: Identify the threat; harden vehicles; conduct convoy briefing; execute motor movement; defend against attack; defend against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED); conduct convoy consolidation and reorganization; conduct actions at the Release Point (RP); describe the purpose and functions of the gun truck; identify gun truck crew duties; harden gun trucks; employ gun trucks; identify emerging enemy trends on the battlefield.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management - This regulation instruction prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities governing the employment of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) in support of the National Guard homeland security, homeland defense, contingency operations, special events, incident of national significance, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission. National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package Management - This regulation delineates the responsibilities and details the processes and procedures for management of the National Guard (NG) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (NG CERFP). In the United States, the civil emergency management structure manages the consequences of the release of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) involving CBRNE devices. The National Guard leverages its war fighting capability to support the civil authorities by providing a disciplined, well trained, and well equipped organization to supplement local, state, and federal efforts to manage the potentially catastrophic effects of terrorism, or provide special technical support to augment specific needs of the Incident Commander (IC). NG CERFPs are designed and trained to provide search, extraction, medical triage, and decontamination of casualties during CBRNE events and advice and assistance to the IC, State Emergency Management, the State's Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ-State), the Adjutant General, the Governor, and other key officials, including representatives of federal agencies. The capabilities of the NG CERFP for search, extraction, medical triage and treatment, decontamination, and remains recovery can also be used in support of natural disasters where individuals have been trapped in structures and/or require decontamination from exposure to toxic materials such as petroleum products, pesticides, raw sewage, and structure debris that have been spread through flooding, explosion, or other means. This regulation establishes the processes and standards for synchronized, integrated, and seamless NG CERFP employment on short notice to assist local and state governments in protecting public health and safety. WMD Civil Support Contents: References - 1-2 * Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms - 1-3 * Responsibilities - 1-4 * Exception to Policy - 1-5 * WMD-CST Overview - 1-6 * The National Response - 1-7 * Chapter 2 * WMD-CST Response Management Plan * Introduction - 2-1 * WMD-CST Response Sectors - 2-2 * WMD-CST Response Status - 2-3 * WMD-CST Response Management Planning Factors - 2-4 * Deployment Standards - 2-5 * Chapter 3 * WMD-CST Mission Requests and Validations * Introduction - 3-1 * Mission Categories - 3-2 * Request Validation - 3-3 * Responsibilities - 3-4 * WMD-CST Support Requests - 3-5 * Chapter 4 * Alert and Deployment * Unit Recall and Predeployment Planning - 4-1 * Movement Planning Guidance - 4-2 * Transit Timelines and Considerations for Movement - 4-3 * Rapid Reaction Airlift for an Unplanned Event - 4-4 * Plans and Orders - 4-5 * Chapter 5 * Command and Control * State and Federal Authorities - 5-1 * Title 32 Status - 5-2 * Title 10 Status - 5-3 * Federal Support - 5-4 * Relationships with Other Military Response Elements - 5-5 * Chapter 6 * Reporting * Critical Information Requirements

Recent improvised explosive device (IED) and active shooter incidents reveal that some traditional practices of first responders need to be realigned and enhanced-with an emphasis on early hemorrhage control and a more integrated response by first responders (i.e., emergency medical services [EMS], fire, law enforcement, and rescue personnel)-to improve survivability of victims and the safety of first responders caring for them. At the request of first responders and first receivers (e.g., medical technicians, nurses, and physicians) who have encountered mass casualties from IEDs and/or active shooter incidents, this document was developed to provide guidance on how to better approach these incidents. Responders should also consider the combination of both IEDs and active shooter incidents in an organized, complex attack (such as the Mumbai attacks in 2008) that requires both treatment and extraction of the injured from a still-hostile environment. The conditions during such tactical assaults in a civilian setting speak to the need for first responders and first receivers to adopt evidence-based hemorrhage control, risk evaluation, and casualty management measures in a potentially dangerous environment. As a result of these developments, the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Security Staff, has developed recommendations for individuals who provide emergent and immediate medical management of casualties resulting from IEDs and/or active shooter incidents. Based on best practices and lessons learned, this document focuses on the medical response to IEDs and/or active shooter incidents with recommendations for hemorrhage control, protective equipment (which includes ballistic vests, helmets, and eyewear), and response and incident management.

Case studies include lethal and nonlethal missions performed by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The events chronicled span the spectrum of participants from officers to noncommissioned officers, and from combat units to support personnel, all in contact with a vicious and unforgiving enemy.

Den amerikanske hærs første officielle historiske beretning om operationerne i den anden Irakiske Krig, "Operation Iraqi Freedom", (OIF). Fra forberedelserne, mobiliseringen, forlægningen af enhederne til indsættelsen af disse i kampene ved Talil og As Samawah, An Najaf og de afsluttende kampe ved Bagdad. Foruden en detaljeret gennemgang af de enkelte kampenheder(Order of Battle), beskrives og analyseres udviklingen i anvendte våben og doktriner fra den første til den anden Golf Krig.